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IN SOVIET WEST UKRAINE, 1944-1948
 
*
“War displays forms of male violence against women
that are usually blurred and kept hidden but implicit by
peacetime social structures.”
 






On 21 January 1947, working on information obtained through reliable informants,




) of the Main Directorate for the Struggle Against
Banditry (
 
Glavnoe upravlenie po bor´be s banditizmom — 
 
GUBB) of the Soviet
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) learned the location of the hideout of




(SB), or Ukrainian rebel
underground intelligence service, and a member of the central command of the
 
1. Claudia Opitz, “Von Frauen im Krieg zum Krieg gegen Frauen: Krieg, Gewalt und




, 3, 1 (1992): 31-44. Cf. Ruth
Seifert: “War crimes against women have a symbolic meaning and must be analyzed within the
symbolic contexts of the nation and the gender system.” (“The second front: The logic of sexual
violence in wars,” 
 
Women’s Studies International Forum,
 
 19, 1-2 (1996): 35-43).
* I would like to express my thanks to the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, which has
generously supported this research. I am grateful to the following archivists and scholars who
provided assistance in Russian and Ukrainian research collections: S. V. Mironenko, V. A.
Kozlov, and D. N. Nokhotovich in the State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow; K.
M. Anderson, N. V. Murav´eva, and E. E. Kirillova at the Russian State Archive for Social and
Political Research; V. I. Kutsynda and the late L. M. Minaeva of the State Archives of L´viv
and Drohobych oblasti (Ukraine); Liuba and Oleh Kiselik of the Center for Ukrainian Studies
(L´viv); Iu. I. Shapoval, N. V. Makovska, and I. L. Komarova at the Central State Archives of
Public Organizations of Ukraine (Kyiv). Thanks are also due to John Armstrong, Chrystia
Chomiak, Arch Getty, Christina Gilmartin, John-Paul Himka, Hiroaki Kuromiya, Norman
Naimark, Natalie Nenadic, Douglas Northrop, Gabor Rittersporn, Roman Senkus, Patty
Slotter, Andrei Sokolov, Terry Martin, and Lynne Viola. 
Place names and transliterations correspond to the Library of Congress system for
translations from Russian and Ukrainian. For the sake of consistency, all Ukrainian place











 The Soviets had hunted for Mykhailo as a priority target for
apprehension or liquidation for more than five years, and they took every
precaution to make sure he did not slip away. His hideout was located just two









On the night of the 21st of January, a heavily armed Soviet unit surrounded
Mykhailo’s underground hideout, and ordered those inside to surrender. One of the
men in the hideout responded with a volley of machine-gun fire, and was instantly
cut down. In the ensuing minutes, and faced with insurmountable odds, Mykhailo,
his wife “Vera” and his communications officer “Natalka” set fire to documents.
Then, one by one, Mykhailo killed his wife and his messenger with shots to the
head from his own revolver, then subsequently turned the gun on himself.
The four bodies were later identified from MVD “trophy photos” taken at the
scene. Mykhailo was Mykola Arsenych-Berezovskyi. Born in 1910, and with a
higher education, he joined the OUN in 1939, after he fled the Soviets by crossing
over into German-occupied Poland. In 1940, as the Germans prepared to invade the
Soviet Union, Mykhailo received advanced training in sabotage and diversion at a
special espionage school for infiltration agents set up by the Germans in Krakow.
After leaving the school, Mykhailo began working in the central command of
Ukrainian rebel intelligence from 1940. Returning to Ukraine as an officer in a
special sabotage unit attached to the German army in June 1941, Mykhailo was
appointed commander-in-chief of the entire SB by the end of the first year of the war.
Mykhailo’s wife Vera had been the chief of the women’s unit in the L´viv city
command of the OUN. Natalka had been a liaison officer for the central staff of the
OUN. The face of the fourth — another man — had been destroyed by a grenade
and was unrecognizable.
Despite Mykhailo’s frantic efforts to destroy SB archives before his suicide, the
successful Soviet seek-and-destroy operation recovered two knapsacks of
documents from his dugout. These included valid Soviet passports with assorted




 identification cards, lists of locals




 By far the most valuable document
 
2. The two key agencies of the Soviet secret police were the People’s Commissariat of Internal
Affairs (NKVD) and the People’s Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). In March 1946,
they were renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Ministry of State Security




 or special tasks units were subordinated to the
NKVD/MVD’s State Directorate for the Struggle Against Banditry (GUBB). Thereafter, they
were transferred to the control of the MGB until the reorganization of the Soviet police system
following Stalin’s death in 1953.
3. See the original report in a coded telegram from the scene, dated 27 January 1947.
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. R-9478 Glavnoe upravlenie po bor’be
s banditizmom MVD SSSR (1938-1950 gg.) (GUBB MVD/NKVD SSSR), op. 1, d. 888, ll. 111-
112; and the top secret report from Soviet MVD S. Kruglov to Stalin, dated 29 January 1947.
GARF, f. R-9401 Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del SSSR, 1934-1960 (MVD SSSR), op. 2, d. 168,
ll. 145-146. This account is substantiated by versions published in the OUN’s own histories. See
Petro R. Sodol, 
 
Ukrains´ka Povstancha Armiia, 1943-1949. Dovidnyk 
 
(New York: Proloh, 1994-
1995), 2 vols, I: 64. In this diaspora account, Mykhailo is said to have died “a heroic death,” while
neither his wife nor his communications officer are even mentioned.
 




recovered from Mykhailo’s personal archive was an eight-page letter he had
written to Roman Shukhevych, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurrection
Army, just one week before Mykhailo’s death. In that letter, Mykhailo perceptively
appraised the status of the Ukrainian insurrection, and identified the chief threat to




: “Secret informers — these are the most




’ (mosquitoes) infect the




 we have suffered our
greatest losses.” Mykhailo was certain that these secret informers were ubiquitous
within the rebel movement: “If one considers that there are no less than five such




Unknown to Mykhailo, the rebel leadership, or to scholars for the next fifty
years was the fact that Mykhailo’s whereabouts had been betrayed by a Soviet




The Soviet recruitment of agent “Natalka”
 
Natalka’s story was all too typical. Her recruitment in June 1945 had been handled




 tactics in West Ukraine,




. Sokolov was so good at his job —
transforming diehard anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists into members of his own
force to destroy the rebel underground — that he had written the standard primer









4. Arkhiv MVD SSSR, f. 488 Upravlenie vnutrennikh voisk MVD Ukrainskogo okruga, op. 1,
d. 227, ll. 76-95. 
5. Soviet police files are problematic sources. For a survey of special concerns, see Boris V.
Anan´ich, “The historian and the source: The problems of reliability and ethics”; and Jeffrey
Burds, “Ethnicity, memory, and violence: Reflections on special problems in Soviet and East




, “Archival politics in
dissolving states,” William Rosenberg and Nancy Bartlett, eds, 2002.
6. “Nastavlenie po ispol´zovaniiu voisk NKVD pro provedenii chekistko-voiskovykh
operatsii,” NKVD SSSR, top secret, 1944. From a third typescript copy preserved in Arkhiv SB
(L´viv, Ukraine). According to his personnel file at GUBB, Major A. M. Sokolov, Chief of the




 in early 1946, was later that year transferred for
special duty in Lithuania, “as a person having practical experience regarding the organization




” — the GUBB clandestine units that specialized in domestic black
operations. Sokolov’s specialty was disorganization. See GUBB chief A.A. Leont´ev’s orders
for Sokolov’s temporary transfer to Lithuania, dated 26 March 1945. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1,





underground anti-Soviet partisans in the postwar suppression of anti-Soviet rebels in Lithuania,
see: Juozas Daumantas [alias for Juozas Luksa], 
 
Fighters for freedom: Lithuanian partisans
versus the USSR (1944-1947)
 
 (Toronto: The Lithuanian Canadian Committee for Human
Rights, 1975), 2nd ed.: 81-82; and K. V. Tauras, 
 
Guerilla warfare on the amber coast
 
 (New
York: Voyager Press, 1962): 78-80. Also see top secret communiqué from Deputy MVD V.
Riasnoi to Lithuanian MVD Major-General Vartashunas in Vilnius, 29 June 1946. GARF, f. R-











networks as a means to sow suspicion among anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist





powerful tactical weapon utilized by the Soviets to provoke rebel terror as a means









: how the Soviets detected the opportunities afforded by the rebels’ shift to
gender-based recruitment tactics, and how they eventually began to target ethnic




 or “secret agents” to provoke
cancerous terror reprisals from within the underground. 
In this pursuit, we are fortunate because Major Sokolov left a detailed
handwritten account of his successful turning of agent Natalka in a top secret report
to Major-General A. P. Gorshkov, the chief of the First Department of the elite





 Sokolov wrote in his candid summary report:




office had detained a [rebel]
courier — ‘Natalka’ — who had confessed during interrogation that she was a








She [Natalka] had tried to escape from her place of detention — and had even
shot with a pistol the militiaman who was guarding her. And it was evident from





My assistant — Lieutenant-Colonel [A.I.] Matveev — and I went to




Soldiers shared stories, and during her short time in Soviet captivity, Natalka had
already earned herself the reputation of a “cantankerous filly” who would be a
challenge to break. Evidently, Sokolov was lured by the challenge.
Self-confident after a series of successes, Sokolov took personal charge of
Natalka’s recruitment. 
 
7. See Jeffrey Burds, “AGENTURA: Soviet informants’ networks and the Ukrainian rebel
underground in Galicia, 1944-1948,” 
 
East European Politics and Societies,
 
 11, 1 (Winter
1997): 89-130.
8. The extraordinary summary report was originally written in Sokolov’s own hand, preserved
in GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 487, ll. 175-199. Subsequently, the report was typed and re-
submitted over Sokolov’s name to Leont´ev, with a cover letter from Gorshkov successfully
nominating Sokolov for a medal. See the typed and corrected report on GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1,








  in 1945.




 commander in Ternopil. Nestor
was not apprehended in this operation, but was subsequently killed by the Soviets in March










mean: “This was an interesting person.” But here and throughout the account of Natalka’s
recruitment, Sokolov uses sexual connotations, and hence the dual meaning: “her figure was
interesting” or “she had a good figure.”
 




“When we arrived in Berezhany, she was being interrogated by GUBB-NKVD
Ukrainian SSR Lieutenant-Colonel Kaganovich. She gave her answers in such a
way that made it impossible to exploit them operationally. It was clear she was
lying about everything, and hiding something big.
I shared my opinion with Matveev, who agreed with me, and so we decided
to take her to Chertkov. During her interrogation at Chertkov, she likewise
essentially gave us nothing, so [my commanding officer Colonel A.A.] Saraev




, take her back to Berezhany, and
find some way of compelling her to tell us what she knew, and to exploit that
information uncovered during her interrogation.”
Sokolov’s account does not reveal what happened in the intervening period.
Whatever happened between Sokolov and Natalka for the few days before he chose
to bring her back to Berezhany, she evidently returned convinced that she had
fooled Sokolov into believing she was now a Soviet agent. The wily Sokolov knew
otherwise, and time and again in his account, he seemed to recognize and respect
the fact that threats, violence, and intimidation alone would never break Natalka.
Her turning would require a major deception.
“On our return to Berezhany, I decided to act as if [I believed] she had been
successfully recruited. And so I gave her her first assignment: to murder [her
commanding officer in the rebel underground] ‘Nestor.’ I was confident that she
would run, and had set a plan wherein during the time she was trying to escape
us she would be captured by [one of my units operating] under the guise of the




. One could do nothing else
with her.
On the road to Berezhany, we made sure she did not see the entire unit. We
treated her well. In Berezhany I formally recorded her recruitment, gave her the
assignment to murder ‘Nestor,’ issued her a pistol (with the firing pin removed),









. Feigning compliance, she indicated that she often met with some
rebel soldiers from Nestor’s unit in a cottage in village Byshky. The rebel soldiers,
she alleged, would lead her from there to Nestor’s hideout in the woods. Sokolov
played along, but unknown to Natalka, he ordered an NKVD unit to surround the
village and make sure no one escaped.
“Just as I suspected, so it happened: Natalka went into the cottage for a few
minutes, then exited through the rear door, and hid herself in the cornfield
behind the cottage. My agent Horodetskyi saw everything, but let her sit a while
 
11. For the NKVD/NKGB, “formally recording a recruitment” was a highly ritualized
procedure that included the requirement that new recruits sign written oaths of allegiance to
Soviet power, and choose a special field alias, a new name for their work as Soviet agents.
Psychologically, this process was designed to assist the recruit to adopt a new identity.
Practically, it also put the recruit under the total control of Soviet police: if leaked, that







in the corn. Then, as if by accident, [and masquerading as an SB officer] he





Natalka was evidently floored, and utterly duped by the ruse. She immediately
imparted to the false SB chief that she was a liaison officer for the central staff of
the OUN, and that she needed to see her commanding officer as soon as possible.
Having missed the first two planned meetings with her associates, she had just one
more fallback meeting before her contacts would assume she had been arrested, and
would sever their contact altogether. The information she carried was of vital
interest to the rebel underground, and she begged the SB chief to help her.
Continuing the meticulously planned and executed masquerade, Horodetskyi
resisted, called Natalka a liar and provocateur desperate to save her own skin.
Following standard SB procedure, Natalka was blindfolded and led to a hideout in
Berezhany, where she was interrogated at length. More and more desperate, only
then did Natalka pass the point of no return and become an unwitting accomplice of
the NKVD: she confessed to know the location of a liaison point in village
Avgustovka where she could connect with the leadership of the rebel unit Belyi. 
That was all Sokolov needed to know. The well-hidden rebel hideout of Belyi
unit was subsequently taken, most of its inhabitants captured alive. The rebel
commander “Rynchak” was killed in the operation, but his deputy commander
“Chad” was captured alive and broken. And step by step the operation to turn
Natalka began to bear fruit. Interrogated by the Soviets, Chad revealed the location
of a rebel hideout near village Rai where rebel commander Belyi was supposed to
be quartered. Instead, his adjutant “Artem” was surrounded: Artem too resisted,
setting fire to his archive, to a large cache of money, and to his hideout — even
killing his own woman liaison officer “Legeta” before he was shot in the leg while









, and he and Sokolov worked together closely to exploit his
intimate knowledge of local rebel units. Chad led the Soviets to “Chaban,” former





, and his extensive knowledge about the identities and
locations of local rebel cadres kept the Soviet secret police in Ternopil busy for an
entire month of successful liquidation operations. Just one successful recruit had
delivered a devastating blow to the SB in Ternopil.
 
12. Initially resistant to Soviet overtures, “Artem” — alias for Vasyl´ Chizhevs´kyi — was
eventually turned by the Soviets. Soon after, in April 1945, he became chief of communications
between rebel units of the UPA under the leadership of Roman Shukhevych and their foreign
base of operations in Munich, Germany. Traveling back and forth between Galicia and Munich,
Artem was — according to diaspora sources — captured by the Soviet MGB on the
Czechoslovak border with West Germany on 4 December 1945. In fact, as Sokolov’s account
suggests, Artem was probably turned into a Soviet double agent as early as April 1945; which
means the 4 December “arrest” was probably just a regular debriefing by his Soviet controllers.
In any case, Artem continued to work for the Soviets until summer 1947, when he was











From this point, we lose track of Natalka in declassified Soviet files for nearly
eighteen months, until the operation to liquidate Mykhailo in which she herself was
killed. Undoubtedly, Sokolov imparted to his unwitting recruit the consequences of
her information, news that would have broken her psychologically: the rebel
underground did not tolerate betrayal, and took no account of a traitor’s motivations
or circumstances. Natalka had but one choice: either to cooperate with Sokolov, or
to die, and bring reprisals on her family and loved ones. Such was the impeccable






The gender question and the Ukrainian rebel underground
 
One of the most notable features of the history of gender in the Ukrainian
underground of the 1940s is the relative silence about women’s contributions.
Soviet operations files reveal a regular presence, even majority, of women in
Ukrainian rebel operations. In contrast, Ukrainian nationalist and diaspora
publications contain comparatively little concrete information regarding women’s
roles in the underground. It is remarkable that in a literature that has produced such
a rich and voluminous hagiography of Ukrainian male heroes, there are so very few
accounts of women warriors. In the most recent two-volume edition of nationalist
biographies, for instance, Petro Sodols 
 







there are 338 “heroes” (and traitors) named,
but only 17 are women. Of those 17 women members of the UPA, less than a
handful were noted to have died “heroic deaths” in the field of battle against the
Polish, Soviet, or German enemy. And, without exception, these 17 women heroes
were deemed heroic either because they were murdered, because they served prison
sentences, or — most often — because of their contributions to ancillary branches
of the movement: to culture, child care, or education. In almost every case, ethnic
Ukrainian women considered worth remembering for their contributions to the
underground were wives, siblings, or offspring of male heroes. Equally telling is
 
The Ternopil area: A list of heroes of the Ukrainian revolution fallen in the struggle
with the Russian Bolshevik occupying power, 13.3.1944-31.12.1948
 
, originally
published in typescript in September 1949. The memorial book identifies 718




In a rare example where the heroic roles of Ukrainian women rebels have been
discussed in detail, Marta N. (the writer’s alias for UPA hero Halina Savits´ka-
Holoiad) upheld the Soviet observations that Ukrainian women proved to be just as
courageous and steadfast in the field of battle as men. “A woman [in the Ukrainian
underground],” she wrote in the late 1940s, “would always heroically maintain
herself during Bolshevik or Polish interrogations, betraying neither secrets, nor
 
13. Reprinted in a corrected edition, Ie. Shtendera and P. Potichnyj, eds, 
 
Ternopil´shchyna.

















okupantom za chas vid 13.3.1944 r. do 31.12.1948 r. 
 










 Similarly, Soviet and
German intelligence and counter-intelligence operatives consistently observed
that, under interrogation, “female agents usually stuck more obstinately to their
stories than did male agents. Logical arguments brought forward by the
interrogating officer who tried to explain that the stories told by female agents





 Women were, it was generally believed among
interrogators, harder to break with logical arguments, or the threat of force. Instead,
women and children agents were more easily recruited either with blackmail or




We are left then with this conundrum: why, if in most Soviet accounts Ukrainian
women played such a notable role in the Ukrainian liberation movement after the
war, has so little been written on women’s contributions? Why do we know so little
about the women who belonged, and especially about their contributions beyond
the ancillary roles in provisions, communications, and medical aid? 
The challenge of ferreting out women’s roles in West Ukrainian rebel operations
goes far beyond merely chronicling women’s substantial contributions. It also involves
coming to terms with the haunting silence that has marked the intervening period.
 










ka Armiia: Zbirka dokumentiv za 1942-1950 rr.
 
 (Munich, 1957), Ch. 1:
90.
15. D. Karov, 
 
Interrogation methods used by German counterintelligence in Kharkov, Russia,
1941-1943
 
 (Historical Division of the U.S. Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch,
1953): 14. On men versus women agents in Ukraine, see pp. 12-13. Declassified by the U.S.
Department of Defense on 31 October 1997. MS# P-138.
16. Cf. the 20-page, closely reasoned analysis of Soviet secret police methods in West Ukraine
entitled, “Agentura NKVD-NKGB v deistvii,” produced by the Ukrainian rebel SB. GARF,
f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 643, ll. 13-34. 
 The only full-length West Ukrainian women’s memoirs fail to discuss women’s
contributions on their own terms, but instead discuss memories of heroic men. For the most




 (Toronto-L´viv: Litopys UPA,
1995) (Litopys UPA, Vol. 28). Similarly, of 25 autobiographies of women members of the





, Vol. 1 (L´viv: Prosvita, 1993), only one discusses women’s
contributions in detail. The overwhelming majority are victimologies chronicling the writer’s
hardship at the hands of Soviet authorities.
 The other famous example of women’s service to Ukrainian nationalism is likewise founded
on the image of women as victims: during an inmate uprising in the Soviet forced labor camp at
Kengir in 1953, more than 150 Ukrainian women and girls demonstrating in a peaceful march
were crushed to death by Soviet tanks deployed to suppress the “riot.” This case is often
referred to in Ukrainian and diaspora texts to demonstrate the courage of Ukrainian women.
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Women in West Ukraine
 
“In war women have to do things they wouldn’t dream
about in peacetime. We all have to survive.”
 




NKVD operations reports, informants’ files, and documents seized from the
Ukrainian underground during the wartime and postwar periods reveal that there
was a dramatically increased role of women in the anti-Soviet Ukrainian rebel
underground in 1944-1945. Upon reflection, that observation seems reasonable.
Ethnic Ukrainian men in West Ukraine between 1939-1950 had a one-in-three
chance of dying during the era — either from violent disputes with ethnic Poles, the
mass arrests and mass executions that marked the Soviet occupation of 1939-1941,
followed immediately by the period of Nazi occupation from June 1941 to July-
August 1944. Young men fit for work also stood a good chance of deportation — to




 under the Nazis. By
autumn 1944, with the return of Soviet forces to the region, any Ukrainian male
fourteen years or older was likely to be arrested, shot, or forced into Red Army or
NKVD/NKGB service. Most West Ukrainian men aged 14-45 were as a result
driven to forests or into underground hideouts, literally tombs underground where
they waited for the end of hostilities. Friendly cadre or enemy other, the anti-Soviet




At the height of the Soviet battle to re-occupy West Ukraine by driving out the









 wrote in an extended report dated 21 August 1944: 
“The Jew-Communist-Bolsheviks treat us [Ukrainians] like enemies. Not a single
young [Ukrainian] man can even be seen by the Bolsheviks [without being
detained, beaten, shot, or taken away]. The NKVD is conducting arrests with the




) and terror. In this way on 13.8.44 in village
Lavrikiv nine people were arrested with the help of two informants — one of
them, a Belorussian who had been here since 1941, and the other a fool from our
own headquarters,
 
 who gave away and ruined our whole network. [The Soviets]
surround villages, then detain anyone they can find. They so harshly taunt [villa-
gers] that in the end [the Soviets] manage to find out everything they know: who
was the officer-in-charge of the local band, where he is hiding, where are all the
men. The bolsheviks used this method in Bilka Masovitska. On 16.8.44 they
surrounded almost 200 people in the village, but arrested only the 50 men, and beat
them very badly. They took 10 men away with them, and left 2 very seriously
 
17. Quoted in Waldemar Lotnik, 
 
Nine lives: Ethnic conflict in the Polish-Ukrainian
borderlands
 
 (London: Serif, 1999): 191.
18. For a parallel case, see the perceptive reading of Lynne Viola, “‘We let the women do the
talking’: Bab´i bunty and the anatomy of peasant revolt,” in id., 
 
Peasant rebels under Stalin:
Collectivization and the culture of peasant resistance 
 
(New York: Oxford University Press,
1996): 181-204. Viola explains how comparatively lenient Soviet treatment of women led
peasants to develop distinctly feminine forms of popular revolt, where women often led the






beaten. Some others were freed that same day, but the remaining 25 men were held
until 21.8.44. In the same way on 18.8.44 [the Bolsheviks] surrounded village
Lypna, detained all the men in the village and took them away with them, burned
down three homes, shot one, and then left for Rava-Rus´ka.” 
It had gotten to the point, he wrote, that “whenever [men] catch sight of even one









 in early August
1944] there was a recruitment levy that took away many men. The old men were




The initial impact of the Soviet re-occupation of the western borderlands drove
local men away from their villages. This observation was confirmed in numerous
eyewitness reports. A doctor in eastern Poland, Zygmunt Klukowski in
Szczebrzeszyn, left a description of the same pattern of gender-specific targeting by





evening on Sunday, Soviet troops encircled the village of Maszow. Going from
house to house, they arrested approximately three hundred men, all of draft age, and
transported them to the military barracks in Zamosc. It seems that this is the new




 In a March 1945 letter to her relatives, ethnic





“Spring here will be difficult. The Germans carried off all our horses and wagons,
while the Soviets [have taken all the] men up to age forty-five into the army. Only a




 In a similar
vein, another peasant woman from Drohobych, M. S. Vasiurko, wrote to her
husband on 4 April 1945: “It’s very warm here now, the weather only knows how to
be spring. But this comes to nothing since we have no horses in the village, and




In the early Soviet occupation of West Ukraine in 1944, violence was
perpetrated and repression was applied in a gender-specific way. Initially,
Ukrainian men bore the brunt of the Soviet onslaught, while women — though
 
19. Report of the UPA company commander Erema dated 21 August 1944, found on the corpse
of a rebel in Orlik company following a Soviet firefight on 24 August. The subsequent
translation was forwarded by Lt.-Col. Tarasenko, deputy commander of the 5th Department of
the Ukrainian NKVD. Derzhavnyi Arkhiv L´vivskoi Oblasti (DALO), f. 3 L´vivskyi obkom
Kompartyi Ukrainy, op. 1, d. 70, ll. 56-56 ob.




 rebel commander Kochevik to OUN
headquarters, subsequently seized by the NKVD. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial´no-
Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), f. 17 Tsentral´nyi Komitet VKP(b), op. 125, d. 336, l. 181. 
21. Zygmunt Klukowski, 
 
Red shadow: A physician’s memoir of the Soviet occupation of
eastern Poland, 1944-1956
 
 (Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 1997):24.













, dated 20 March 1945. Interdicted and
copied by military censors. DALO, f. 5001 Drohobychskyi obkom Kompartyi Ukrainy, op. 6,
d. 46, ll. 96-96 ob.








, to her husband, dated 4 April 1945. Interdicted and copied by military censors. DALO,
f. 5001, op. 6, d. 46, l. 97.
 




victimized directly and indirectly — were (comparatively speaking) far more free
to move around and go about their lives. Under the circumstances, and with no
other choice, the Ukrainian nationalist underground relied increasingly on women
and girls to perform tasks vital for the rebel movement. 
This had not always been the case. John A. Armstrong has upheld the traditional
impression that women were largely ignored in the ranks of the Ukrainian rebel
underground before 1944. “In general, nationalist observers agree that the
[Ukrainian] women were less politically active than the men. While there is too
little evidence to warrant a firm conclusion on this score, it is just possible that the
[Ukrainian] nationalist movements neglected a useful source of support, which was





But necessity is the mother of invention, and in West Ukraine, this translated
into a Ukrainian rebel policy that increasingly targeted women and girls as recruits
into vital services for the rebel underground. The architect of this fundamental shift
of tactics of the OUN and the UPA from a focus on male to female recruitment was









 The transcript of an NKVD
interrogation of L´viv city SB chief Iosif Pan´kiv, captured by the Soviets on 28
October 1944, is quite specific about the new gender-based tactics of the Ukrainian
underground on the eve of the Soviet return to West Ukrainian zones: “Working on
the basis of an evaluation that men, particularly members of the SB, would with the
arrival of the Red Army be seriously hampered operating as ‘legals’ in L´viv,
MIKUSHKA decided to reorient [our tactics] towards the utilization of women for




 Subsequently, Pan´kiv was ordered to dismantle existing male-
based networks, who were reorganized into military units mobilized for the partisan
war against the Soviets. In their place, Pan’kiv recruited and trained women agents
exclusively. As he prepared to leave L´viv himself, Pan´kiv’s own 23-year-old




The call for more women in the ranks of the underground was soon taken up by
the supreme command of the Ukrainian nationalist rebel leadership. Initially, mass
recruitment began to attract more women into ancillary roles: for instance, there
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Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990): 187-188. On gender and Soviet partisans, see the
groundbreaking discussion in Kenneth D. Slepyan, “‘The people’s avengers’: Soviet partisans,
Stalinist society and the politics of resistance, 1941-1944,” Ph.D. Diss., University of
Michigan, 1994, 250-265.
25. One of these new recruits was Mariya Savchyn (alias: Marichka), who has left an extensive








26. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 135, l. 193.
27. Evidently, “Ul´iana” was herself turned and became a Soviet agent in June 1945. Though
her agent files were removed to central archives of the Committee of State Security (KGB), her
agent folder still remains, along with an informational note regarding her recruitment. The
report reveals she was a high-priority agent run directly by T. A. Strokach, People’s Commissar
of Internal Affairs (NKVD) in Ukraine. See the folder and Strokach’s report (dated 13 June
1945) in GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 487, ll. 75-76: “Dublikat lichnogo dela agenta UL´IANA.” 
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were instructions in July 1944 to increase the number of women in economic
work.28 A rebel communiqué dated 14 August 1944 expanded the role of women in
underground communications: “As soon as possible organize a communications
network with sub-raion OUN units. Each communications link should be
composed of four girls: one from the raion, and three from the sub-raiony.”29 On 11
August and again in early October 1944 there were explicit instructions to expand
zhinochi sitky — rebel “women’s networks.”30 These expanded networks were to
become the recruiting grounds for reliable women to perform more clandestine
work: women in communications, liaison work for underground transport along
clandestine routes, espionage, and attached to specific units for medical care,
provisions support, and even military and so-called “black” or “wet” operations.
Rebel instructions from October 1944 reflected these more varied roles for women:
“Under various pretexts send some of the [rebel] cadres — especially women — to
the towns and [infiltrate them] among the [Soviet] workers.”31 Other instructions in
October 1944 required Ukrainian women to work in the UChKh — the Ukrainian
Red Cross.32 After rudimentary training, beginning in late 1944, additional women
agents of the Ukrainian rebel underground were regularly sent into eastern Ukraine
for clandestine operations.33 Soon, it became standard operating procedure that
Ukrainian “women are just as obligated to serve underground as men. […] All
women in the underground should carry pistols and, depending on availability,
other weapons.”34 By July 1945 Soviet NKVD units were regularly reporting
evidence of armed rebel units made up predominantly or exclusively of young
Ukrainian women.35
28. Secret rebel “temporary instructions” on the arrival of the Red Army in West Ukraine,
dated 7 July 1944. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 126, l. 234
29. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 336, l. 48. 
30. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 126, ll. 226-228 ob.; ll. 315-315 ob. 
31. Instructions from the OUN-UPA’s central headquarters, dated 10 October 1944, as
preserved in Stalin’s MVD “Special Files.” The top secret report of Beriia to Stalin was dated 6
January 1945. GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 92, l. 55. There are indications that this “feminization
of the underground” was common in all areas that fell under Soviet control. See the numerous
references to women in Z.Klukowski, op. cit.: passim; eg., p. 41: “It is possible to [maintain]
contact […] only through women messengers.”
32. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 126, ll. 316-317 ob.
33. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 292, l. 15.
34. DALO, f. 5001, op. 7, d. 220, l. 143.
35. See, for instance, the handwritten field report to the chief of the Shumskyi raion NKVD
Capt. Tresko from operations commander in Shumskyi raion, NKVD officer Iakovlev.
Iakovlev described an UPA raiding unit of ten women armed with tommy guns and dressed in
military clothing that sometimes masqueraded as a Soviet partisan unit. GARF, f. R-9478,
op. 1, d. 487, ll. 203-203 ob. 
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The feminization of the Ukrainian underground
“Woman, when intent on turpitude, is capable of soun-
ding lower depths than the vilest of the male species.”
Hamil Grant, Spies and secret service (1915).36
Even before the Soviet “liberation” of West Ukraine by the end of July-August
1944, the marked shift in rebel tactics to utilize women warriors was noted
favorably in German military intelligence reports. In a top secret memorandum,
General-Major Brigadeführer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS-
Obergruppenführer General Hans Prützmann — the highest ranking German SS
officer in Ukraine and the architect of the so-called “Prützmann Bureau,”
Germany’s stay-behind or “werewolf” networks — that “The UPA has halted all
attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents
(razvedchiki), mainly young women, into enemy-occupied territory, and the results
of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the [German] Army
Group” on the southern Front.37 This report was captured by the Soviets and
became part of the Soviet NKVD’s permanent “special file” on German wartime
and postwar intelligence operations in West Ukraine.38
The distinct gender shift in Ukrainian rebel tactics had almost immediately
become apparent to NKVD field units operating in West Ukraine. In a top secret
36. As cited in Julie Wheelwright, The fatal lover: Mata Hari and the myth of women in
espionage (London: Collins & Brown, 1992): 1. On images of women in espionage, see the
provocative work of Christine Bold, “Under the very skirts of Britannia: Re-reading women in
the James Bond novels,” Queen’s Quarterly (Summer 1993): 311-328; and Julie Wheelwright,
“Poisoned honey: The myth of women in espionage,” Ibid.: 291-310. For a summary of women
as targets of espionage recruitment, replacing the traditional "honey trap" with a modern
"Romeo spy," see the autobiography of the chief of foreign security operations of the East
German Stasi, Markus Wolf, “Spying for love,” Man without a face: The autobiography of
Communism’s greatest spymaster (New York: Random House, 1997): 123-150.
37. GARF, f. R-9401, op. 1, d. 4152, l. 340. On "Prützmann Bureau," see Perry Biddiscombe,
Werewolf! The history of the national socialist guerrilla Movement, 1944-1946 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1998).
 In contrast, the Germans themselves evidently avoided using women agents in the East:
“Female Agents: It was feared that a woman who was open to German suggestions could too
easily be influenced again in other ways. Also, troop discipline was impaired when women
were employed. Therefore, F[ront]A[uf]K[laerung] III used women agents only in special
cases where no other solution could be found.” The FAKs were responsible for front
intelligence and counter-intelligence for the Abwehr. “German methods of combating the
Soviet intelligence services,” 3 May 1946, NARA RG 319 Records of the Army Staff, Records
of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence. Records of the Investigative
Records Repository. Security Classified Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers, 1939-76,
NND921046 Heinrich Schmalschlaeger, IRR Box 11, Folders 1-2, 5-6.
 German tactics had changed by the end of the war. “Among the trainees [for Werewolf
detachments] were women and large numbers of Hitler Jugend.” NARA, RG319 Records of the
Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Records of
the Investigative Records Repository. Security Classified Intelligence and Investigative
Dossiers, 1939-76. U.S. Army Interrogation of Josef L. Roosen, 29 May 1945. Extract, 3.
38. On Western intelligence operations in West Ukraine during and after the war, see Jeffrey
Burds, The early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh, 2001) (Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, N° 1505) .
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memorandum dated 11 November 1944, NKVD Major in Soviet State Security
V. A. Chugunov summarized information gleaned from interrogations of key
personnel in the Ukrainian underground. His report spearheaded the growing
Soviet awareness of a shift in rebel tactics that utilized Ukrainian women and girls
more extensively than before: 
“Following the expulsion of the German occupation from the western oblasti of
Ukraine and the conducting of a mobilization of the male population into the
Red Army, by order of the regional command of the OUN there were created
village, sub-raion, raion, territorial (okrug), and oblast´ OUN command centers
from among [local] women, who have the following departments (referentury):
economic, communications, and reconnaissance.
 At the present time the women’s Economic Department plays the principal
role in gathering provisions and other items needed by the UPA, since they can
usually go about their economic activity more or less without suspicion. All
collected provisions and items are then transferred to rebel control.
 The primary task of women’s reconnaissance (razvedka) is the collection of
information about the movements of Red Army units, and about the departure
from raion centers of NKVD personnel for operations. An officer-in-charge
(stanichnaia) [is appointed from among local] women [who] each day assigns
each of several female agents (razvedchitsy) to specific tasks. Every female
agent is required to report back to a local command center three times a day
(morning, afternoon, and evening) to find out what is new, and [to indicate]
whether there are [Soviet] troops there [in her sector], and to inform the [female]
officer-in-charge in the neighboring village regarding the situation in the village
from where she came. This information is verified [each day directly by the
female officer-in-charge] in a personal meeting with each female agent. Each
day information is centralized with the local female officer-in-charge, who must
make the decision whether to warn the rebels or to conceal illegals [hiding out
nearby].
 Women liaison [officers] (sviaznye) operate constantly and must maintain
strict clandestinity. The liaison in one village knows the identity of only one
liaison in a neighboring village, the one with whom she must maintain contact.
[Rebel] correspondence moves from village to village along this relay network
(estafetnaia sviaz´), as do various orders, pamphlets, and nationalist literature.
These same female liaison [officers] also serve as commanders of various
messengers (posyl´nye), who follow the organization’s affairs and keep tabs on
the movements of OUN members.”39
Local women and children were commonly responsible for sounding the alarm to
warn rebels illegally hiding out in or near their village. Since the traditional cry of
“Kloptsi, vorog blyz´ko!” (Men, the enemy is near!) increasingly brought reprisals,
the new cries by the end of 1944 were designed to protect the speaker from Soviet
retaliation: “Bandits!”, “They’re robbing us!”, or “They’re killing us!”
39. Top secret communiqué of deputy chief of the Sixth Department of OBB NKVD SSSR,
MGB Major Chugunov, 11 November 1944. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 381, ll. 164-168. The
report is based on a summary from interrogations of captured OUN-UPA personnel conducted
in October 1944: D´iachishyn and Mykhailo Gachkevych. For biographical information, see
P.R. Sodol, op. cit., II: 21. 
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Of course, gathering intelligence is not the same as developing successful tactics
to combat the problem. In this case, the growing reliance of rebel forces on women
and children was reflected in Soviet files more and more often throughout late 1944
and early 1945, as Soviet personnel scrambled to come up with a solution. In a top
secret report dated 6 October 1944, the commander of the NKVD border patrol on
the Ukrainian front observed the sticky problem of Ukrainian women and children
spies who, he argued, were seriously undermining the effectiveness of Soviet
operations: 
“Many children aged 12-15 and women have worked and continue to work as
active informants and messengers between bands and underground organiza-
tions of the OUN and UPA. They also organize the delivery of provisions for the
bands and warn them about the appearance of [Soviet] border patrol units in
their populated areas and about the latter’s possible military operations against
them. This corresponds with the instructions of OUN Center, which ordered
[local commanders] to utilize [more] women for underground work — mainly
for center-periphery communications.”40
The feeling that Soviet occupation forces were not doing enough to combat the
specific challenges associated with women and children warriors appeared with
rather alarming ubiquity in reports flowing out of West Ukraine. As the
Zholkevskyi raion secretary Bychkov observed in a tête-à-tête with Ukrainian
General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in January 1945: the Ukrainian underground
“has a large women’s organization — the so-called women’s network (zhinocha
sitka). […] [Women] are their main force — in communications (signalizatsiia),
provisioning, and so on. I have met them. Yet we arrest very few women.” Bychkov
added sinisterly in a direct personal appeal to Khrushchev: “We have got to do
something more about these women!”41
Not a single woman appeared among rebels killed or captured in the regular
NKVD reports to Stalin regarding the struggle against the resistance in West
Ukraine until February 1945.42 From that time on, women appeared more and more
frequently in those summary reports of rebel casualties, reflecting the increased
40. From a top secret report of the commander of the NKVD border patrol on the Ukrainian
front to Grushetskii, 6 October 1944. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 70, l. 5 ob. 
41. From the stenographic report of Khrushchev’s meeting with leaders of the Soviet drive to
pacify West Ukraine, 10 January 1945. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 191, l. 51. 
42. This is based on a review of periodic reports to Stalin from the NKVD, preserved in the
State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow, indexed in V. A. Kozlov and S.V.
Mironenko, eds, Osobye papki I. V. Stalina (Moscow: Blagovest, 1994). The first Ukrainian
woman spy to make it into reports to Stalin was Dr. Mariia Kotsiuba, a.k.a “Marta,” detained in
Stanyslaviv in February 1945. “Marta” was the daughter of a famous Ukrainian-Galician
general from World War I, M. Tarnavskyi. See GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 93, ll. 54-62, top
secret report dated 12 February (ll. 55-56).
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proportion of suspected rebel women killed by Soviet forces in local reports.43
Although there are no gender breakdowns in aggregate numbers of casualties
reported by the Soviets, it is possible to reconstruct the growing proportion of
women as victims of Soviet violence through specific reports.
By March 1945, the ranks of the OUN-UPA had shifted from a relatively low
reliance on women to an absolute dependence on women and girls in virtually every
sector of underground activity. To take one example: from 20 February to 24 March
1945, the regional organs of the NKVD and NKGB arrested 115 members of the
OUN underground in Lopatynskyi raion (outside L´viv). Of these, 25 had carried
on underground infiltration work for the OUN in the raion capital, passing
information back to military units in the field. The majority of these rebel secret
agents were women.44
Such a rising proportion did not go unnoticed by local Soviet cadres responsible
for suppressing rebel activities. For instance, Borgunov, the party secretary from
Strumilovskyi raion (also near L´viv), identified women as the chief enemy to
Soviet power off the battlefield: “We have an enormous number of [Ukrainian
rebel] women’s networks (zhenskie setki, ‘zhinocha sitka’). From the data it
appears that in villages with, say, 1,000 people, there are 50-60 members of the
OUN, and a considerable proportion of them are women. In some villages, they
direct the [underground] work. Women’s networks are not [as a rule] military units,
but rather form the organizational, ancillary force of [rebel] bandits, with whom,”
Borgunov concluded ominously, “we must reckon, if not now then later.”45
“The sins of their fathers”: The Soviet drive against insurgent families
The unprecedented growth in numbers of Ukrainian women in the underground
movement in 1944-1945 was more than just a matter of shifting rebel needs. The
induction of increasing proportions of Ukrainian women into the rebel underground
corresponded with a general political awakening of West Ukrainian women under a
brutal Soviet occupation. Women were drawn into rebel support for a variety of
reasons, but here as elsewhere a Soviet policy that failed to distinguish between
civilians and organized rebels powerfully encouraged Ukrainian women’s greater
43. For a depiction of the “heroic” aspects of women’s contributions to the Ukrainian anti-Soviet
underground resistance, see Marta N. [Halina Savits´ka-Holoiad], “Zhinka v Ukrains´komu
vyzvol´nomu Rusi (Z vlasnykh sposterezhen’),” in S. F. Khmel´, Ukrainska partyzanka: z
kraiovykh materiialiv (London: Vyd. Zakord. Orhanizatsii ukr. natsionalistiv, 1959): 88-102.
Marta N. also offers numerous cases of Ukrainian women tortured for information about
underground rebels. More recently, see twenty-five autobiographical sketches by women in the
Ukrainian underground, published in Litopys niskorenoi Ukrainy, op. cit., I: 424-640; and
fifteen biographies of women rebels in P.R. Sodol, op. cit., I: 70-73, 79, 83-84, 104-105, 116-
117, II: 10, 20, 26-27, 35-36, 44-45, 81.
44. From the report of the Secretary of the Lopatinskyi raikom Kostenko, DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d.
195, l. 115. 
45. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 195, l. 125. For similar data, see GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d 126, ll.
201-202. Here, among 300 members of an OUN-UPA band, 80 were women. 
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participation in the anti-Soviet insurgency. The main problem was that women and
family members were implicated and punished for the activities of their menfolk.
As a Ukrainian rebel officer noted in an August 1944 report: “The Bolsheviks, not
understanding what they themselves are doing, either drive people into hiding or
arrest them. We must take this into consideration since in [Soviet abuses] lie both
our strength and our hope.”46 
Punishing family members in insurgent areas was a vital and intrinsic part of
Soviet police methods. As early as January 1945, the Soviets were keenly aware of
distinct gaps in their methods. At a conference of raion chiefs and NKVD-NKGB
officers in L´viv oblast´, these principal agents of the Soviet pacification were
openly critical of the failure to do more about rebel families. “In our work there is
one mistake,” argued the commanding officer of the 88th NKVD Border patrol.
“We kill rebels, we see the rebel lying dead, but each [dead] rebel leaves behind a
wife, a brother, a sister, and so on” — family members whose shared sense of
victimization would generate incalculable future resistance. When, he asked, will
Soviet forces begin to punish families?47 
Among Soviet officials in West Ukraine, there was a dawning recognition that it
was not enough to remove the active rebels alone: rather, the cancer of opposition
had to be torn out by the roots — by harassing, arresting, imprisoning, torturing,
and deporting family members as well. In a highly charged exchange with
Khrushchev in a February 1946 meeting of raion and oblast´ party, NKGB and
NKVD chiefs plus battalion commanders in West Ukraine, Drohobych obkom
secretary Oleksenko made a direct appeal to Khrushchev himself: “I beg you,
Nikita Sergeevich. Give us the echelons so that we can deport the families of the
rebels. This has great significance and will help us to achieve [our goal]. We are
ready to conduct mass deportations. […]”48 
Within weeks, Khrushchev gave his formal approval for expanded operations,
and the mass deportations of rebel families from West Ukraine expanded
dramatically. As of June 1945, 10,139 Ukrainian families (26,093 persons) of
suspected anti-Soviet rebels had already been deported to Siberia.49 Initially,
“Many believed that we [Soviet officials] would not actually deport them, but were
only trying to scare them.”50 The bitter truth came as the pace of deportations
46. Report of the UPA company commander Erema dated 21 August 1944, found on the corpse of
a rebel in Orlik company following a Soviet firefight on 24 August. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 70, l. 56.
47. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 191, l. 46. A report from Drohobych dated 27 December 1945 suggests
substantial popular support for this notion. DALO, f. 5001, op. 6, d. 53, ll. 233-234.
48. Extract from “Stenogramma soveshchaniia sekretarei Obkomov KP(b)U, nach[al´nikov]
oblupravlenii NKVD, NKGB, komanduiushchikh voennykh okrugov, ot 14 fevralia 1946 g.,”
Tsentral´nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads´kykh Ob´´iednan´ Ukraïny (TsDAHO), f. 1 TsK
Kompartii Ukrainy. Osobyi sektor. Sekretnaia chast´, op. 23, d. 2884, l. 39.
49. Data for seven oblasti in West Ukraine compiled from reports in GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d.
349, l. 1; d. 352, ll. 69-77. 
50. The popular response was summarized in regular reports. See, for example, a report of
Drohobych obkom Oleksenko to Khrushchev, dated 27 December 1945. “O reagirovanii naseleniia
i banditov na vyselenie semei banditov,” DALO, f. 5001, op. 6, d. 53, ll. 233-234 (l. 233).
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accelerated. By the end of 1947, a total of 26,644 “rebel families” — 76,192
persons — had been deported from the seven oblasti of West Ukraine to the Soviet
Far East: 18,866 men; 35,152 women; and 22,174 children — meaning that women
and children dependents outnumbered their adult male counterparts by more than
three to one. In a resolution dated 10 September 1947, 21,380 families — 61,814
persons — from West Ukrainian oblasti were assigned work in coal-mining
operations in the Soviet Far East.51 Deportation meant intrinsically that Soviet law
would punish not just suspected rebels, but also their families as well.52 Caught
within this catch-22 imposed by a brutal Soviet occupation policy, women and girls
increasingly joined the ranks of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet rebel underground.
Women spies
The gender shift in rebel procedures dictated a distinct Soviet tactical response: to
destroy the Ukrainian underground through its female-dominated liaison networks.
While a series of factors on and off the battlefield had provided new opportunities
for women among the Ukrainian rebels, the growing reliance of rebels on women
and girls also provided new opportunities for Soviet security forces to infiltrate and
liquidate rebel forces through the use of ethnic Ukrainian women spies.
To counter the newly perceived threat associated with women, the Soviets
instituted systematic raids and repeated mass arrests of local Ukrainian women. In
doing so, the Soviet police pursued two main objectives. First, consistent with
Soviet agentura tactics generally, they worked to sow suspicion within the ranks of
the rebel underground: by arresting virtually everyone, the Soviets undermined
rebel vetting procedures, and made it very difficult for the rebel SB to verify cadres.
Second, the Soviet goal was to find the proverbial needle in a haystack: in the
course of arresting and interrogating large numbers of women in the underground,
Soviet police evidently treated every detained Ukrainian woman or girl as an
enemy. Guilty or innocent, local women faced interrogations that were at the very
least terrifying, but more often brutally violent, and in which the Soviets imparted a
51. Top secret report of MVD Kruglov to Stalin and Beriia, dated 7 February 1948. GARF, f.
R-9401, op. 2, d. 199, ll. 205-209. The West Ukrainian families were relocated under the rubric
of Sovnarkom resolution No. 35, dated 8 January 1945, regarding political deportation or
spetspereselentsy. In October 1947 alone, 13,592 persons from the organs and armed forces of
the MVD took part in mass deportations of members of families of suspected active rebels.
GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 199, ll. 288-298; GARF, f. R-9479 Otdel spetsposelentsev NKVD
SSSR, op. 1, d. 257 “Svodnye statisticheskie dannye”; and “Dokladnaia zapiska o
provedennykh meropriiatiiakh po obespecheniiu vyseleniia semei aktivnykh natsionalistov
banditov,” MGB-Ukraine Savchenko to L. Kaganovich, dated 14 October 1947. RGASPI, f. 81
Kaganovich, Lazar´ Moiseevich (1920-1957 gg.) [1893-1957], op. 3, d. 129, ll. 226-232. 
52. The most comprehensive study to date of Soviet deportation policy is I. V. Alferova,
“Gosudarstvennaia politika v otnoshenii deportirovannykh narodov (konets 30-kh — 50-e
gg.),” Dissertatsiia kand. ist. nauk, Moscow: Moscow State University, 1998. Cf. Terry Martin,
“The origins of Soviet ethnic cleansing,” The Journal of Modern History, 70, 4 (December
1998): 813-861.
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sense of “knowing” the arrested woman had actively worked with the underground.
If the woman detainee was actually innocent, from the Soviet point of view, no
harm was done: a few days later, she would be released, battered but free. And her
experience would have the added advantage of intimidating any future
collaboration with rebels. But if the woman was guilty, the systematic cycle of
sleep- and food-deprivation, isolation (including incarceration in a dark room with
executed corpses), brutalization, and intimidation usually broke the prisoner.53
The texture of women’s experience in the Ukrainian underground is best
understood by looking closely at the interweaving of private and service lives of
women rebels. Intrinsically anecdotal, each life represents in itself a powerful
illustration of the complexity of the era, and of the often elusive series of factors that
transformed some Ukrainian women rebels into Soviet siksoty, or secret agents.
Against a background of wholesale violence and abuse, interrogation and agent
recruitment took on numerous subtleties and variations. Soviet police files offer us
valuable insights into the complex process of siksotka recruitment, and the factors
that motivated ethnic Ukrainian women to betray their former cohort in the nationalist
underground. An especially useful case study is the story of the arrest, interrogation,
and recruitment of Liudmilla Foia, an ethnic Ukrainian woman who survived
repeated rape, beatings, and interrogations for over two months, but was only
“turned” when her parents were implicated. Foia’s case is especially revealing
because of the virtually unprecedented quality of her files: in the archives appear not
only her Soviet police records, but also the records of her subsequent interrogation by
the Ukrainian rebel underground, captured two weeks later in a Soviet raid. 
Liudmilla Foia was born 3 September 1923 in the village of Topora, Ruzhanskyi
raion, Zhytomir — in central Ukraine. The unmarried daughter of an ethnic
Ukrainian school teacher and war veteran who had served in the Austrian army from
1914 and the struggle for Ukrainian independence in 1918, Foia became a member of
the OUN in 1942, at the age of nineteen. Subjected to three months of incarceration,
brutality, rape, and deprivation, Foia was turned as an agent of the NKGB in April
1944, when her interrogators delivered an ultimatum: work with us, or your family
will be made to suffer for your obstinate resistance. She operated under the code name
“Aprel´ska” until her detention by the Ukrainian SB at the end of May 1945.54
53. Here, the texts of Soviet police files differ markedly from claims presented in post-Soviet
memoirs of detained Ukrainian women. I have yet to find a single account left by a detained
woman (or man) where she admits to having been broken during interrogation. In contrast,
Soviet records suggest summary execution was standard practice for non-cooperative
prisoners, and moreover that most prisoners did, as we would expect, break during Soviet
interrogation. 
54. The record of Foia’s biography is preserved in the case files for a failed NKGB penetration
operation against the northwest sector of the OUN-UPA in 1945. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d.
643, ll. 237-311. The file includes Foia’s records with the NKGB, plus the transcripts of her
interrogation by the Ukrainian underground, plus similar records for two other Soviet double-
agents apprehended in the sting. The file also includes a perceptive analysis of the failed
operation by Lt.-Col. V. Konstantinov, Deputy Director of GUBB’s First Department. 
 Elsewhere I have described the pivotal role played by Aprel’ska in a failed Soviet MGB
penetration operation in 1944-1945. See J. Burds, “Agentura,” art. cit.: 121-123.
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Unlike so many other women siksoty who collaborated with the Soviets, Foia
was not executed following her apprehension by Ukrainian rebel counter-
intelligence. Recognized for her beauty and her integrity, Foia candidly responded
to questions, and in the course of her ordeal managed to win the respect of her
interrogator, the commander-in-chief of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych.
Shukhevych was so impressed by Foia that he enlisted her into underground
cultural work, and sent her to deliver lectures about her personal experiences to
Ukrainian women’s groups throughout West Ukraine. From this point, we lose
track of Foia in the Soviet files.
Alas, other Soviet women agents were not so fortunate. Alla Linevych, agent
“Galka” in Soviet files, was only eighteen when — in October 1944 — she was
arrested following a denunciation by a local member of the OUN during Soviet
interrogation. An ethnic Ukrainian woman from village Bol´shaia-Tseptsevychy,
Vladimiretskyi raion, Rivne oblast´, she was at the time of her arrest a low-ranking
member of an OUN communications network in her native region. She drew the
attention of Soviet officers not just because she was beautiful, well-spoken, and
smart, but also because she was very well-connected. Her forty-year-old brother,
Aleksei Linevych, was a former deputy commander of the UPA’s Kora band in
their native region, and had recently been appointed commander of the local SB
unit Barsuka. One of Galka’s closest friends was Mariia Demydovich (alias:
“Rusal´ka”) an ardent Ukrainian nationalist who was chief of OUN
communications in Sarnenskyi, Rafalovskyi, and Vladimiretskyi raiony.55
Galka’s first assignment was to recruit her brother, agent “Burak,” into Soviet
intelligence work, which she did successfully in October 1944. Soviet files here and
elsewhere refer only to “verbovka agentov” — agent recruitment — and generally
fail to mention that most recruitments were accomplished with threats to loved
ones, holding family members hostage until a written oath was taken by the ob´´ekt
or target of recruitment, and then that oath was proven in a Soviet operation. Active
service was generally considered the line of demarcation or “point of no return” for
ethnic Ukrainian collaborators, since acts against the nationalist underground
carried with them an automatic death sentence to be carried out by rebel punitive
units not only against the agent, but also against his or her family as well. Agent
files reveal a disturbing pattern: male or female, young or old, once a person was
targeted for Soviet recruitment, few could resist. Which was why so many OUN-
UPA rebels chose to fight to their deaths, or even to commit suicide, rather than to
be captured alive. The Soviets evidently had a relentless capacity to break rebels
once captured, and the overwhelming majority — men as well as women — were
usually turned into Soviet assets. 
Having successfully recruited her own brother for the NKVD, agent Galka’s
second assignment powerfully reveals the brutally tragic lives of Soviet siksoty. On
55. Biographical information for Agent Galka has been drawn from her agent file. GARF, f. R-
9478, op. 1, d. 487 “Materialy o rabote spetsgrupp, deistvuiushchikh v zapadnykh oblastiakh
U[krainskogo] SSR (1945 g.),” ll. 53-54, 59. The operation was run by NKVD officer of state
security, third rank, Riasnoi, future deputy director of the Soviet MVD.
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2 November 1944 Galka was ordered to murder her close friend Rusalka, which she
did early morning on 11 November in Tseptsevychy forest with a shot from a
Soviet-provided pistol. A Soviet spetsgruppa handled disposal of the body. The
Soviets intended the murder to open the way for one of their own agents, ideally
Galka herself, to step into the position of chief of rebel communications in that
sector. That Galka herself should have been forced to carry out the murder was a
normal part of Soviet agent recruitment: transforming ardent rebels into faithful
agents by forcing them to perpetrate unforgivable acts against their own. With this
baptism in blood, agent Galka was both psychologically and physically ready for
more complicated operations. This Soviet figurant — Russian for “stage
performer” but also an NKVD euphemism for an agent performing in a field
operation — was ready to dance.
Unfortunately for the Soviets, and for Galka herself, their plans to infiltrate her
into the Kora band with the aim of its eventual liquidation (razlozhenie) were
foiled. It seems that even as one Soviet NKVD team was positioning Galka-
Linevych to infiltrate the Kora band, another NKVD team was trying to accomplish
the same task with their own agent Galka, formerly “Kapustianskaia,” one
Anastasia Spitsyna, recruited in late 1944 and sent against the Kora band in
December. Less well-prepared for the tasks ahead, Galka-Spitsyna apparently gave
herself away almost immediately, and was subsequently detained and interrogated
by the rebel SB. The problem was that Soviets had received intelligence from one
of their informants that their agent Galka had been unmasked. In an effort to rescue
the operation, Galka-Linevych was called back.
As a result of her abrupt removal from the field, Galka-Linevych’s cover was
blown; she was, in NKVD parlance, rasshifrovana. Rebel reprisals were brutal and
immediate. Her brother Aleksei was detained by the rebel SB, interrogated,
tortured, and sadistically murdered. Her mother and aunt, who lived in village
Tseptsevychy, were assassinated, their corpses desecrated in the normal way
vengeance was meted out to family members of traitors. All of the family’s
possessions were either destroyed or carried away by a rebel band. Following
standard SB practice, the Linevych family name was forever annihilated in that
village.
Soviet case files for agent Galka-Linevych end there: with the demoralized and
terrified Galka hidden away in a Soviet safe house in Rivne, awaiting her next
instructions. A mere eighteen and a half years old, she was already directly
responsible for the murder of her best friend, and indirectly responsible for the
deaths of her beloved brother, mother, and aunt. But her Soviet controller still had
further plans for her, and it was clear from her case files that “she would be used
[again]” — literally “used,” budet ispol´zovana — “for operations against the OUN
underground.”56
56. Top secret report of Captain of Soviet State Security Artiunov, dated 17 April 1945. GARF,
f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 487, l. 59.
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Ostensibly, agent Galka-Spitsyna fared better. The SB commander who
interrogated Galka-Spitsyna persuaded her to write a harshly anti-Soviet note to the
Vladimiretskyi raion NKVD chief. Attached to the note was a communication from
the SB commander to the local NKVD chief indicating that Galka-Spitsyna’s life
would be spared. He taunted: “You should not think that Ukrainian
insurrectionaries cut off the heads of Russians and others because of their
nationality. No. We Ukrainians love the peoples of other nations, but despise your
communes and collective farms.”57 Though the NKVD made an active effort to
apprehend Galka-Spitsyna, those operations were unsuccessful. The search
continued for some months, but the Soviets lost all trace of her. 
The rebel response: liquidating the women’s threat
“Anyone who helps the Stalinist clique will be drowned
in the blood of the [Ukrainian] people.”
OUN-UPA Instructions, October 1946.58
Soviet success at infiltrating the Ukrainian underground through women spies
forced the rebel leadership into a powerful conundrum: absolutely dependent on
women and girls, how was the underground to rid itself of the threat posed by
suspected “weak” or “treacherous” cadres — especially (in their view) women —
who had been turned by Soviet perfidy? The cold ingenuity of the Soviet tactics
consisted not so much in the ruthless application of violence, but in the
effectiveness with which the Soviet special police units provoked a palpable
atmosphere of suspicion within the rebel underground. Violence begot violence,
and Soviet recruitments of local siksoty provoked a bloodbath of rebel reprisals
against members of their own cohort, especially against young ethnic Ukrainian
women and girls. This was an intrinsic part of Soviet dezorganizatsiia, or
disorganization: to force the rebels to violate their own rules of engagement; to
provoke the underground into escalating the terror against their own cohort, with
the inevitable result of sowing suspicion and distrust within organized resistance,
and driving a wedge between rebels and the local civilian population.
The cultural milieu of the rebel underground fighter played directly into the
hands of Soviet provocateurs. For the underground war in West Ukraine was driven
by a distinct machismo, one that preached loyalty unto death as its most sacred rule.
The confrontation between Soviet cadres ready to stop at nothing to crush the
underground, and rebel leaders who preached martyrdom as a sacred duty of
national patriotism, created the setting for scenes like this one, where a former
member of the Soviet special forces in West Ukraine bragged among fellows in the
Higher Party School in Moscow in summer 1945: “I hung one nationalist upside
57. Top secret report from GUBB Lt.-Col. Gritsenko in Rivne to Leont´ev and Zadoia in
Moscow, dated 22 February 1945. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 487, ll. 62-63.
58. DALO, f. 5001, op. 7, d. 220, l. 143.
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down and burned him on a slow fire; I cut pieces of flesh out of him […] and he, that
son of a bitch, died shouting ‘Glory to Ukraine!’ What a son of a bitch! How many
of them I tortured!”59
In the face of Soviet terror, all Ukrainians — men and women alike — were
expected to bear the strain with stoic bravery. To communicate that message, the
Ukrainian rebel leadership had even prepared a special Handbook for underground
partisan warfare to assist in the proper training of nationalist soldiers. The
Handbook contained stark images of real-life experiences of the true underground
warrior: 
“There are various tortures. Regular beatings, sleep deprivation, water torture,
other physical tortures (needles under fingernails, fingers between doors, tearing
out of hair…) and finally moral tortures ([the promise of enticements like]
money, foreign passports, family, ideas…). A lot of them. One has to be ready
for them by now and in full consciousness (without hesitation) to tell oneself this
cardinal ninth point of our ten commandments — ‘Neither entreaties, nor
threats, nor torture, nor death will force me to betray secrets.’”60
Countless other instructions echoed the same basic message: “Prohibit
underground cadres from operating alone. Everyone should be assigned to a
designated unit, ready to fight to the very end, and should know that no one should
surrender alive into the hands of the [Soviet] enemy.”61
In such a context, surrender was construed as an act of treachery punishable by
death — with underground reprisals often carried out not only against the one who
surrendered, but likewise against his or her family members as well. 
There was widespread expectation that captured women rebels would toe the line,
martyring themselves or committing suicide rather than surrendering alive to the
Soviet enemy. While countless instructions reminded men and women rebels alike of
the sacred code of struggle unto death, one can also observe a concerted effort of the
rebel leadership to wean themselves of their dependence on women cadres. A close
investigation reveals a rather remarkable evolution of rebel attitudes: from a general
consensus of the unsuitability of women for most kinds of rebel work up to 1944; the
59. Words of a student in the Higher Party School in Moscow, as reported by Ukrainian film
director Oleksandr Dovzhenko in his diary, entry dated some time between 30 June-11 July
1945. Cited in the Introduction to Litopys UPA, Vol. 1 Vydannia Holovnoho Komanuvannia
UPA (Kyiv-Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1995), ix, xx. Extract originally published in Aleksandr
Dovzhenko, “Dnevnik. 1945, 1953, 1954,” Iskusstvo kino, 9 (1989): 48.
60. From the 29-page partisan handbook produced in 1942: I. I. Zdorovenko, Sanitarni
vkazivki v naglikh zakhvorinniakh (populiarnyi doklad). There are several soiled copies in
Derzhavnyi Istoricheskyi Arkhiv L´viva (DIAL), f. 201, op. 1t, d. 269. This section is based on
the version appearing in ll. 32-47. The quote appears on l. 46.
 I. I. Zdorovenko was one of several aliases of Vasyl Kuk, high-ranking officer of the OUN-
UPA. Though he preached suicide before surrender, Kuk was himself captured alive, served 25
years in Soviet prisons, and was released after serving his full sentence in 1972. He still lives
today in Kyiv, Ukraine.
61. OUN-UPA instructions dated 10 October 1944, translated and copied to Stalin’s “Special
Files” by the MVD. GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 92, l. 52. Emphasis in the original.
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sudden reliance on women for numerous tasks after the arrival of Soviet forces in
West Ukraine in July-August 1944; and a growing resentment towards women in key
rebel positions as Soviet intelligence more and more successfully infiltrated the rebel
underground by forcing ethnic Ukrainians (men, women, and children alike) into
agentura or Soviet-operated informants’ networks.62 By the end of 1946, a backlash
from within the rebel underground greatly curtailed or rolled back women’s roles in
key branches of the underground rebel force.
That backlash began within individual units. For instance, the commander of an
SB unit, “Stepan,” ordered members of his unit to “discharge women from work in
the organization.”63 Similarly, the last of eight points of instructions distributed in
late 1946 on the need for strict conspiracy among members of the rebel
underground emphasized the particular danger posed by women: “Do not speak
with girls about organizational questions. Try to avoid them. The [Soviet] enemy
specially sends women in order to initiate a love connection with members of the
OUN, using her [sic] to obtain information. More than once through marriage
‘revolutionary’ activity was transformed into an aid to the enemy, and in this way
[careless rebels] have paved their own way to their deaths.” 64
Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaliuk, who wrote the Ukrainian diaspora’s definitive military
history of the struggle against the Soviets during and after World War II, likewise
identified the chief threat of Soviet infiltration as “sending young girls into the
insurgent areas to gain influence through their sex over UPA commanders or OUN
leaders with the purpose of helping [the Soviets] apprehend or kill them.”65
Spending long winters in the underground, rebel soldiers were deemed easy prey
for these classic espionage “honeytraps.” But the threat of romantic entanglement
was just part of the intrinsic threat associated with the backlash against women in
the underground. Subsequent instructions stipulated that all women, not just
potential romantic partners, represented a perceived security threat for male rebels.
Hence, some rebels — the members of Self-Defense Units (VKS) were singled out
particularly — were strictly prohibited from visiting their womenfolk at all: “The
VKS member has no right […] to visit his mother, wife, children, girlfriends.”66
62. The pattern of accepting women’s changing roles during times of need or crisis, then
reverting back to traditional antagonisms once the crisis has passed, has been observed in
numerous studies of women’s roles in social movements. The very best of a large number of
works on this theme was written by Joan B. Landes, Women and the public sphere in the age of
the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Landes shows that French
women’s opportunities were extensive on the revolutionary barricades, but the same women
were expected to return to traditional gender roles once the revolution was won.
63. Instructions seized from the corpse of an OUN rebel killed in a firefight on the night of 27
May 1945 in Kalushskoi okrug. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 292, l. 66.
64. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2968, l. 203.
65. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA warfare in Ukraine: Strategical, tactical and organizational
problems of Ukrainian resistance in World War II (New York, 1972): 284.
66. From “Instructions for Self-Defense Units,” a copy of which was forwarded from NKVD
Ukrainian SSR Riasnoi to L. Beriia in a top secret report dated 1 December 1944. GARF, f. R-
9478, op. 1, d. 292, ll. 319-324 (l. 324).
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Likewise, by the end of 1946 the long-standing rebel relay courier system of
communication was replaced by a new network of “dead drops” — hidden
locations where the two principals were the only ones to know the location. This
was designed to reduce Soviet access to written rebel instructions, plans, and
communiqués. But it was also a reflection of the general perception in the OUN-
UPA leadership that the weakest links in rebel operations were sectors depending
largely on women. Since over 90% of the underground’s liaisons had been women,
the “dead drop” communications network would remove vulnerability to alleged
“weak women” from vital rebel operations.
A similar strike against perceived “weak women” was the reorganization of the
Ukrainian Red Cross (UChKh) that, until 1946, provided primary medical support
for underground cadres. The Ukrainian Supreme command’s instructions were
explicit: “Instead of women, men are to be trained in special medical courses.”67
The organization of an independent male-provided medical service within the
underground undermined yet another channel the Soviets had used to track rebels.
Rebel death squads
“We warn Ukrainian citizens: anyone who works with
the organs of the NKVD-NKGB, all those who by any
means whatsoever work with the NKVD […] will be
considered traitors, and we will deal with them as with
our greatest enemies.”
UPA Instructions, 11 July 1945.68
“We were not intimidated by the screams or suffering [of
our victims]. […] I don’t remember the last names of the
people we killed. […] I know they were all [ethnic]
Ukrainians, local people.”
From the Soviet interrogation transcript of Rivne SB execu-
tioner A. Kiriliuk, December 1944.69
Even as women were being pushed out of underground work by late 1946, the
Ukrainian rebel underground ruthlessly punished suspected betrayal. As early as
1944, as the underground became more and more dependent on women, special
death squads were formed to liquidate women suspected of collaboration or
fraternization with Soviet soldiers and officials.70 Underground reprisals were, here
as elsewhere, swift and brutal. As one Ukrainian peasant recalled, Ukrainian
67. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2967, l. 45.
68. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 292, ll. 29 ob. As cited in J.Burds, “Agentura,” art. cit.: 104.
69. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 128, l. 227. On following orders, see the testimony of former
teacher and OUN officer Petro Mikitenko, in a Soviet interrogation transcript dated 20-25 May
1944: “In the OUN there exists the principle of vozhdizm (dictatorial rule). The commander’s
order is law for his subordinates.” GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 134, l. 36.
70. On rebel terror units generally, see the author’s discussion in “Agentura,” art. cit.: 104-111.
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underground “rebels brutally murdered my wife, my child, and my best friend. Why
did they murder them?”71 The Ukrainian peasant Bertsiuk from Krakovetskyi raion
complained that rebels had “murdered my wife and two young children. They
burned my house and [ruined] my whole farm.”72 
The standard SB death order reflected the emergence of particular forms of
“women’s treachery.” Typical was this “List of secret collaborators [with the
NKVD] in Region 4,” a Ukrainian rebel SB document seized by a Soviet special
forces unit in Zolochiv raion in late 1944. It is not without significance that six of
eight of the names on the typical list were local women denounced by neighbors
sympathetic to the OUN:
“2) Woman of village Rozvazh MORTSA Yuliia, [ethnic] Ukrainian, in 1941
was a member of the Communist youth (komsomolka) and an informer for the
NKVD. When the Soviets returned in 1944 she began to work still more acti-
vely, denouncing the local officer-in-charge or the provisions expert, [reporting]
what he was doing, whom he was meeting. She informed about everything to the
NKVD and the president of the raion. […] Every day she would stroll with
[members] of the NKVD, and [once was heard to] shout ‘Down with the Bande-
rivtsy!’ She informed against everyone who joined the UPA. 
3) Woman of village Rozvazh POPIUK Olga, Ukrainian, was connected to
the partisans in our village. She informed some [Communist] prisoners about
our entire movement. When the Soviets returned she began to report who did
what in the village, that there were meetings and who attended. She informed
against the families of those who joined the UPA. She informed the NKVD and
the local communist party about all this, reporting who among the youth were
hiding from forced levies, who had deserted from the [Red] Army, or escaped
[forced] labor in the Donbass. She [was heard to] say that the end [was near] for
us and for [independent] Ukraine.
4) Woman of village Rozvazh MIKHAILIUK Yuliia, ethnic Russian,73 was
connected with the Poles and the Soviet partisans, and now has become a major
informer for the NKVD. She informs against those who collaborated with the
Germans, [and] who is still hiding out. She informs the NKVD and the local
party representative about everything that happens in the village. She [was
overheard] saying: ‘Down with the Banderivtsy! Now it’s time to start living the
life we’ve all been waiting for. To hell with you and your Banderivtsy!’
5) Woman of village Rozvazh LYTARCHUK Fima, ethnic Ukrainian,
works as a secret agent of the NKVD, reports about who is in the village, who is
hiding out, and has betrayed many friends — both men and women. She reports
who collaborated with the Germans, and what they did. Has a very strong
connection with the president of the village soviet and the president of the local
party apparatus. She’s been squeezed many times by the NKVD and the local
party representative. She gives everything away: who appears in the village,
71. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 212, l. 114.
72. Ibid., l. 156 ob.
73. The name is actually Ukrainian, which suggests she was probably the offspring of a mixed
marriage: Russian mother, Ukrainian [or East Ukrainian] father; or that she was a Russian
married to an ethnic Ukrainian. Such mixed families were often targeted by rebel suspicion of
pro-Soviet collaboration.
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who is hiding out. [She was overheard] to say: ‘Down with the Banderivtsy!
We’ve waited long enough for freedom. Now it’s time to live!’
6) Woman of village Rozvazh BRONOWICZKA Marianka, ethnic Pole,
works as an informer for the Polish [underground] and the NKVD. Was
connected with the local police. Has informed against those who are hiding out,
who returned from the [underground] army or ran off from [forced] labor in the
Donbass. [Was overheard] saying: ‘Down with Ukrainians and down with
Banderivets families!’
7) Woman of village Rozvazh PUSHKA Agaf´ia, Ukrainian, betrayed
everyone — who collaborated with the Germans, what sort of work they did
[during the German occupation], that there were meetings and who attended the
meetings. She gave away those who are hiding out from the [forced enlistment]
levies, who has deserted from the [Red] Army. She has betrayed many friends —
men and women — to the NKVD: who has weapons, who runs the meetings and
where. She has informed about the whole movement, everything that’s happening
now, and [has been overheard] to say: ‘Down with the Banderivtsy!’
[Signed] ZEVERUKHA. Glory to Ukraine! 
Glory to her heroes!”74
Obviously tenuous and riddled with hearsay, such “documented proof” of a woman’s
alleged betrayal began the process of liquidation. The target lists were themselves
based more on denunciations by neighbors, or misconstrued rumors, than on solid
intelligence. Nonetheless, every one of these women was brutally executed within
weeks of appearing on the underground’s target lists. Regardless of the unreliability
of the evidence, makeshift rebel courts, closely tied to SB assassination teams, did,
as a rule, order summary executions, with little delay between verdict and execution.
There follows an example of a typical rebel death sentence:
VERDICT
“On the 19th day of October 1944 this court of the military tribunal [of the Ukrainian
Insurrection Army], having reviewed the case against MIRONCHUK Tat´iana and
having found her guilty of collaboration with the NKVD, and on the basis of her
confession this court hereby sentences MIRONCHUK Tat´iana to death.
[Added below]
This sentence was carried out on 19.10.1944 at 5 o’clock in the morning. 




74. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 126, ll. 327-328. In 1939, village Rozvazh — Zolovhiv raion,
L´viv oblast´ — had a population of 1,050. It is interesting that the author of the denunciation
was a woman. In a comparable situation, white women in the American south were formally
banned from Ku Klux Klan membership, but nonetheless utilized Klan support for their own
personal ends. See Nancy Maclean, “White women and Klan violence in the 1920s: Agency,
complicity and the politics of women’s history,” Gender and History, 3, 3 (Autumn, 1991):
285-303.
75. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 126, l. 329.
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An especially macabre ritual of rebel execution was that nearly every person
charged was, as a rule, first made to confess his or her treachery. During his own
interrogation by the Soviet NKVD in November 1944, the commander of one of
these special death squads, Iosif Pan´kiv, described the circumstances under which
such confessions were extracted:
“At the end of February 1944 I learned that an actress in the L´viv opera
theater — Maria Kapustenski — was allegedly connected with the Gestapo and
had betrayed another actor, a member of the OUN. 
 With the consent of the SB leadership she was kidnapped by my own people
in the unit and brought to a shooting-range, where we had earlier prepared a
place for her interrogation.
 She was kidnapped outside the [L´viv opera] theater and brought directly to
the site. I personally interrogated her. 
 [Initially] she categorically denied any connection with the Gestapo. So then
we stripped her naked and with willow-switches we had earlier prepared, each
man in my unit beat her until all we had left was one shredded switch. Then she
said she would confess.
 After this [beating], she ‘confirmed’ that she had had a connection with the
Gestapo. Then, under my orders, she was dragged 500 meters from the site of the
interrogation and shot by [rebel soldier] GLUKHYI.”76
Pan´kiv took evident pride in his work, confessing to similarly bloody
assassinations of at least sixty ethnic Poles — suspected German or Soviet
“collaborators” — during the war.77
Soviet investigative files are filled with references to follow-up investigations of
brutal reprisals carried out by rebel SB units against women suspected of pro-
Soviet sympathies. “In village Diad´kovichi [underground rebel units] murdered
Sof´ia PAVLIUK, who heartily welcomed soldiers of the advancing Red Army.”78
“On the night of 19 September [1944] in the village Bol´shaia-Osneshcha,
Kolkovskyi raion the STRESHA band murdered four women, in whose apartments
lived Red Army soldiers.”79 “On the night of 23 September [1944] in village
Mikhlin, Senkovichi raion, a rebel unit of four persons killed four women and
injured one. [The women] had gotten together to write letters to their husbands and
sons [serving] in the Red Army.”80 
76. See the extraordinary top secret transcript of the interrogation of Iosif Pan´kiv, referent of
the SB in L´viv city and simultaneously rezident for German counter-intelligence (Gehlen
Org), conducted by NKVD Lt.-Col. Zadoia on 28 October to 2 November, 1944. GARF, f. R-
9478, op. 1, d. 135, ll. 156-246 (ll. 183-184).
77. Ibid., l. 182. In Pan´kiv’s case, it is evident that other forms of coercion were applied to get
him to speak freely during his interrogation. “I intend to hide nothing from the organs of the
NKVD, since I understand that on this depends not only my own life but — and this is what
disturbs me — the life of my family” (l. 157). 
78. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 128, l. 226.
79. Ibid., l. 228.
80. Ibid.
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While targets of underground rebel violence were certainly not exclusively
women and girls, a close look at patterns of rebel violence against local citizens
suggests that reprisals against “collaborators” was a euphemism for violence
against ethnic Poles during World War II and the first two postwar years, when
three quarters of the violence against “locals” was directed against ethnic Poles.
Following the forced deportation of over 100,000 ethnic Poles from West
Ukrainian oblasti in 1945-1946, however, available evidence suggests that as many
as four of five of victims of rebel violence against suspected “collaborators” were
ethnic Ukrainian women, especially young women suspected of sexually
fraternizing with men of the Soviet occupation.81 These so-called “moskal´ki” — a
derogatory term describing certain ethnic Ukrainian women or girls as “Red Army
whores” — were among the most hated and resented categories of Ukrainian
enemies. A member of the Rivne raion SB, A. Hritsiuk, apprehended by Soviet
police in late 1944 following a denunciation by a local woman, left the typical
confession regarding the rebel drive to annihilate suspected moskal´ki:
“In mid-January 1944 in the village of Iasenichi, on orders of [my unit
commander] ‘DUBA,’ I murdered a 19-20 year-old woman from the village,
Ukrainian by nationality. 
 The murder was perpetrated by means of hanging with a noose [putovaniem
(literally: ‘stringing her up’)]. The corpse was buried by [local] inhabitants at the
site of the execution. […]
 At the end of January 1944 in […] village Hrushvitsa I took part in the
murder of another woman, hanging her with the same noose [the Soviet NKVD]
had used to execute members of the raion SB units ‘NECHAI’ and ‘KRUK’.”82
For perpetrators, victims, and bystanders alike, reprisals were intimate acts of terror
against well-known targets. Hanging was the favored form of ritualized public
execution when rebels perceived some popular support for their action, followed —
in particularly heinous cases of perceived betrayal by the victim — with ritualized
desecration of the corpse.83
Often, orders to execute suspected women “collaborators” were issued well in
advance, and then systematically carried out by specially organized units. One such
SB unit specially designated for carrying out reprisals against suspected moskal´ki
81. Aggregate figures calculating victims of rebel terror do not provide statistics on gender.
These data are based on estimates gleaned from operations reports and rebel target lists from
1946-1948.
82. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 128, l. 227.
83. On corpse desecration, see J. Burds, “Agentura,” art. cit.: 104-111. Soviet records do not
generally include information that would allow for a close study of gender-specific forms of
corpse desecration. See the materials on Bosnian genocide in Natalie Nenadic, “Femicide: A
framework for understanding genocide,” in Diane Bell and Renate Klein, eds, Radically
speaking: Feminism reclaimed (Melbourne: Spinifex, 1996): 456-464.
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was discovered operating in L´viv in June 1948.84 On 21 June 1948, a cleaning
woman at L´viv State University (today, Ivan Franko University in L´viv) was
dumping waste in the university stable when she caught sight of a pile of severed
human legs. In horror, she immediately summoned the police. Upon further
investigation, Soviet investigators uncovered eighteen naked and mutilated
corpses — seventeen women and one adolescent boy. As a member of the unit who
confessed during MGB interrogation recounted:
“The members of the unit [operated] on orders of the OUN underground. From
November 1947 we systematically assassinated persons loyally disposed to the
Soviet regime who lived in regions near L´viv city. With this purpose we met
with those marked for liquidation at the L´viv railway station or the town bazaar,
luring them on various pretexts to the stables at L´viv State University. There we
killed them with blows [wielded] by a blunt instrument to the [back of the]
head.”85
Nearly all of the corpses were so badly decomposed that only six could be
identified by family members (mainly through personal objects or clothing).86 Each
of these six could be linked in some way or other to suspicion of pro-Soviet activity
or fraternization. Details from the list will illustrate the often tenuous reasons for
which SB vengeance was applied:
– MOISIN, Marina, born 1930, age 17. Murdered 8 April 1948. Two cousins of
MOISIN had served in the Red Army. MOISIN had been observed regularly
bringing milk for sale to a building where agents of the MVD-MGB lived. 
– MIRON, Maria, 23 years old. Refugee from Poland. The SB order for her
execution contained only a general indictment: ‘Loyally disposed to the Soviet
regime. Promptly fulfilled all obligations to the state.’ 
– BUIANOVSKAIA, Maria, born 1922, age 25. Murdered 16 June 1948.
BUIANOVSKAIA was deported to Germany for forced labor from 1942 to
1946. Her brother had served in the Red Army and had been killed at the front. 
– IVANISHINA, Anna, born 1908, 39 years old. Murdered 30 May 1948.
Her sister’s husband had been labeled a Soviet collaborator by the underground
84. Top secret report of Chief of GUBB-Ukraine Colonel Sergienko in Kyiv, July 1948.
GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 1285, ll. 19-26. The original discovery warranted a speedily sent top
secret telegram from Deputy Director of MVD Ukrainian SSR Major-General Bulyga to Soviet
MVD S. Kruglov in Moscow, dated 24 June 1948. GARF, f. R-9401, op., 1, d. 2973, ll. 152-
153. In pencil across the top of the telegram, Kruglov wrote: “C[omrade] Serov. Pl[ease] meet
with me. Kruglov.” This communication demonstrates the perceived importance of the case.
There was a subsequent top secret summary report from Ukrainian MVD Strokach to Soviet
MVD Kruglov, dated August 1948. GARF, f. R-9401, op., 1, d. 2973, ll. 283-286. On the first
page of this report, future KGB chief Ivan Serov wrote: “To C[omrade] Davydov. Familiarize
yourself [with this document] and show C[omrade] Kruglov. [Signed] I. Serov. 30.8.48.” 
85. Signed confession of Kuz´ma Ken´o, 24 June 1948, contents communicated by ciphered
telegram to Moscow. GARF, f. R-9401, op., 1, d. 2973, l. 152. 
86. According to Soviet forensic pathologists, none of the corpses had been sexually abused.
Apprehended subjects later confessed that the bodies had been stripped to prevent positive
identification.
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for taking the post of president of a village soviet in 1945. Subsequently, he and
his whole family were brutally murdered in an UPA raid. IVANISHINA had
lived in the same house as her sister, but she miraculously escaped death during
the initial raid. The SB death sentence was eventually carried out nearly three
years later. 
– KUKHAR´, Ekaterina, born 1923, age 24. Murdered 20 May 1948. Her
brother was a demobilized soldier who had served six years in the Red Army. 
– MAER, Pelageia, born 1924, age 23. Murdered in April 1948. She had
worked in ancillary labor during the German occupation. She and the rest of her
family were transported for forced labor in Germany at the time of the German
retreat in 1944. On her return to L´viv oblast´ in 1947, MAER joined the local
Soviet aktiv in her village. Her home was observed by OUN informants to have
been visited frequently by MGB officers.87 
However tenuous these charges may seem now, such minor infractions — the mere
appearance of pro-Soviet collaboration — carried grave consequences: evidently,
the appearance of collaboration was synonymous with an actual act of betrayal
against the Ukrainian people. In each case, the victim had been beaten to death on
the back of the skull with an ax, hammer, or pipe.88 As a reflection of the macabre
ritual interrogation that usually preceded rebel executions of suspected
collaborators, one corpse still had more than a meter of noose around her neck. 
This particular Ukrainian SB assassination squad had nine members, and acted
on the direct instructions of the commander of an UPA regiment based in a nearby
forest in Bibrka raion. One of the university’s wagoners — Kuz´ma Ken´o —
drove periodically to collect wood in the forest and to meet with UPA superiors
who would issue him instructions for relay to the other members of the unit. All of
the executions had been perpetrated under orders. Ken´o had been recruited into the
unit by an old friend, Zakharyi Lychko, an officer from the Ukrainian SS Galicia
Division, who was arrested by the Soviets in 1946.89
The repeated violence against women was certainly noticed and feared by the
local population. As peasant A. V. Vasil´ev wrote from Stryi raion to his cousin on
1 September 1946: “Bandits cut the throats of six women in one night! It’s
87. Summarized from data in GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 1285, ll. 20-21.
88. Forensic specialists suggest this sort of pattern would have indicated two possibilities:
ambush, or the murderer’s own discomfort with perpetrating the violent act. Since in each case
murder was perpetrated in the presence of several men, it is unlikely that ambush would have
been an essential part of the method of execution. Forensic pathologists suggest the act of
violence was distasteful to the perpetrator, who murdered from behind — out of sight of the
victim — so as not to meet the eyes of the woman designated for the kill. This is an important
distinction. It suggests that SB assassins were simply following orders, murdering women
designated for liquidation by others. These were not excesses of an individual unit of sadists,
but fulfillment of duties of rebel soldiers. On rites of violence as indicators of perpetrator
attitudes and motives, see the informative recent study of American expert, John E. Douglas,
Mindhunter: Inside the FBI’s elite serial crime unit (New York: Scribner, 1995). 
89. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 1285, l. 22..
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horrifying here now — you go to sleep and don’t know if you’ll ever wake up
again.”90 
Instructions in mid 1946 ordered OUN-UPA units not to murder Ukrainian
women who wanted to become legal citizens — and to restrict liquidation to
insubordinate cadres, collaborators, and provocateurs, and not their families.91
With the growing demoralization of the underground in the war against the Soviets,
and the decline of cadre discipline, the instructions came too late to exert much
influence. The initial orders to root out women spies gave way to vigilante-style
retaliation against women slurred for a wide variety of reasons. More and more
often, Ukrainian women were scapegoated for the growing frequency of rebel
failures. 
Patterns of denunciation
“I’ve heard about a growing number of denunciations,
usually about hidden weapons. Most denunciators are
women.”
Dr. Zygmunt Klukowski, diary entry for 19 February 1940.92
The cycle of state-sponsored terror and rebel reprisals left the population of West
Ukraine with little recourse but to develop tactics common to marginalized groups
caught in the borderlands between two warring parties: in the public sphere, at least,
they endeavored to appear to collaborate with either side as little as possible. 
Another way of approaching the problem of women in West Ukraine after the
war is to look at patterns of denunciations. There is considerable evidence in Soviet
operations files to suggest quite confidently that women were in fact the primary
channels for leaks to Soviet authorities regarding the whereabouts of members —
mainly men — in the rebel underground.93 But there are two significant patterns
90. From a top secret summary of interdicted letters in Drohobych oblast´ for the period 1-19
September 1946, from MGB Lt.-Gen. Voronin to the secretary of the Drohobych obkom, dated
3 October 1946. DALO, f. 5001, op. 7, d. 279, ll. 119-121 ob. (120 ob.). This report was a
summary of 98 instances of Ukrainian “bandit” activity from 21,325 pieces of mail read by
MGB censors.
91. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2968, l. 54.
92. Zygmunt Klukowski, Diary from the years of occupation, 1939-1944 (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1993): 77. 
 For an interesting comparative perspective of “Judas-women” — women denunciators in
Nazi Germany, see Helga Schubert, Judasfrauen: Zehn Fallgeschichten weiblicher
Denunziation im Dritten Reich (Munich: DTV, 1990). I am grateful to Alison Fleig of Harvard
University for bringing this work to my attention.
93. In contrast, recent research has found that over 90% of denunciations to the East German
Stasi were submitted by men. See Timothy Garton Ash, “Comparative horrors,” London
Review of Books (19 March 1998): 18-20; and Gisela Diewald-Kerkmann, “Politische
Denunziation — Eine ‘weibliche Domäne’? Der Anteil von Männern und Frauen unter
Denunzianten und ihren Opfern,” 1999: Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21.
Jahrhunderts, 11, 2 (1996): 11-35.
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suggested by the evidence. First, Ukrainian women collaborators by and large
imparted information about loved ones with whom they were intimately connected:
convinced of the futility of further armed struggle against superior Soviet forces,
and operating on the hope of bringing the menfolk back home alive, ethnic
Ukrainian women not infrequently passed on information to Soviet authorities. It is
important to note that these were not typically anonymous, back-stabbing
denunciations motivated by resentment, enmity, opportunism, or greed, but rather
acts of feminine mediation motivated by concern and love.94 Caught between the
seeming invincibility and ruthlessness of the Soviet campaign versus the rebel
machismo of “war unto death,” Ukrainian women introduced a third road aimed
primarily at breaking the deadlock of violence and bringing their menfolk back
home alive. As L´viv oblast´ Party secretary Iakov Grushetskii reported to
Khrushchev in late 1945: “The [women] peasants themselves assist the organs of
Soviet power in the surrender of their husbands, brothers, sons and fathers, and
likewise reveal the locations of rebels.”95 A Professor Dumka at the L´viv
Pedagogical Institute unwittingly explained the logic of denunciations to a Soviet
informant: “[Ethnic] Poles and the Soviets are wiping out the Ukrainians. Happy
are the ones who are deported [to Siberia]. Only by this means can you escape
destruction.”96 Under the circumstances, arrest and exile were often preferable to
living in a war zone, caught between two implacable enemies.
A second feature of female denunciations of menfolk to Soviet authorities was
that paradoxically the denunciations were often made at the behest of the men
themselves. Far from being merely passive victims of alleged female weakness —
the orchestrated fiction upon which family survival depended — men in the
Ukrainian underground were often the perpetrators of their own apparent demise.
Why would men in the Ukrainian underground collude with their wives and other
loved ones to denounce them to Soviet authorities? The subterfuge was imposed by
conditions of civil war and terror, conditions that — as we have seen — labeled
surrender an act of overt betrayal and which provoked brutal reprisals against the
ex-rebel and his family and friends by roving SB units. Surrendering members of
rebel units were absolutely clear on this point: “[The rebel officers] warned us that
94. For a useful comparative analysis of denunciations, see Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert
Gellately, eds, Accusatory practices: Denunciation in modern European history, 1789-1989
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
95. Grushetskii to Khrushchev, dated 17 July 1945. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 212, l. 170. For similar
observations, see monthly reports on the struggle against banditry in West Ukraine, TsDAHO,
f. 1, op. 23, d. 1741, ll. 42-48 (l. 46).
 For a comparative perspective on women’s survival strategies, see the insightful work of
Annamarie Tröger, “Between rape and prostitution: Survival strategies and changes of
emancipation for Berlin women after World War II,” in Judith Friedlander, et al., eds, Women
in culture and politics: A century of change (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).
96. Extracts from a top secret special communiqué from NKGB Chief in L´viv oblast´ Voronin
to Grushetskii, dated 19 November 1944. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 212, l. 169. 
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if we surrendered, they would massacre our families.”97 “The unit officers
intimidate us, [saying that the Soviets] will laugh at us and massacre us and our
families.”98 In contrast, to be captured or arrested was not just more honorable
before rebels and neighbors, but also the sole means by which to escape the
underground’s “war unto death.” As L´viv oblast´ Party secretary Iakov
Grushetskii reported to Khrushchev on 12 January 1946:
“Among the banderovtsy familiar with the state decree [of 19 May 1945 offering
amnesty to those who surrender], there are many [rebel soldiers] who desire to
break with their units, but they are afraid of their leaders. So they send their
wives to the NKVD to inform us that they want us to arrest them. […] Surrende-
ring rebels declare: ‘Better to join the Red Army than to know that our families
will be repressed.’”99 
To take just one of many examples: in July 1945, the peasant woman Mariia
Paliuha of Sknylov village, L´viv oblast´, denounced her husband Ivan to local
authorities. Ivan had deserted from the Red Army and joined an underground unit
stationed nearby. Another case involved the passage of a heavily-armed Soviet
special forces unit through the village of Horodyslavich in Bibrka raion (L´viv
oblast´), evidently on a seek-and-destroy mission. A peasant woman who feared the
ensuing bloodbath ran into the street and screamed: “I’ll show you right now where
the rebels are hiding. I’ve had enough of enduring [this violence] and of being
afraid.” She then led the NKVD directly to three hideouts and was personally
responsible for the Soviet capture of eight rebels. At a fourth hideout, the local rebel
unit commander “Rybak” was allegedly shot trying to escape. The same peasant
woman likewise gave the NKVD surnames of twenty more rebels still in hiding.100
Women also denounced rebels to Soviet authorities based on their objections to
the excesses of the rebel terror. In a voluntary denunciation to the NKVD in Rivne
raion in late 1944, ethnic Ukrainian woman E. A. P-k angrily gave up the identities
and crimes of each of the local members of the rebel SB:
“In our village at the end of 1943 a band of murderers calling themselves the SB
was formed. These bandits murdered very many innocent people. I know that
they kidnapped and murdered a local pharmacist and his wife, her name was
Olia, that they strangled a unit of Red Army prisoners who had escaped from a
German prisoner-of-war camp, and that they tortured to death the family of the
[ethnic] Pole ZAVADA.
97. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 212, ll. 169-170. Cf. several similar statements on ll. 168-174.
On the deeper implications of communities that make a virtue of deceiving of outsiders, see
the discussion in Perez Zagorin, Ways of lying : Dissimulation, persecution, and conformity in
early modern Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); and James C. Scott,
Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1990).
98. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 212, l. 169-170.
99. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 212, ll. 115-116. 
100. DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 212, ll. 171-172.
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 To conceal from Soviet power and [local] people their dirty crimes, the bandits
threw the murdered bodies into a well located two kilometers from Diad´kovichi
village at Kurovskyi’s farm.”101
This denunciation was subsequently investigated, leading to the arrest, confession,
and execution of four members of the Ukrainian rebel SB unit in Rivne raion:
Trofimchuk, A. Kiriliuk, A. Hritsiuk, and Slobadiuk.102 In a similar case, acting out
against the murders of several local ethnic Polish families by OUN units, in August
1944, a young Polish woman from village Patsykiv agreed to collaborate with the
NKVD in Stanyslaviv. According to an OUN report, this young woman “betrayed
to the NKVD 20 families and several other young women from village Patsykiv
who had ties to the [Ukrainian nationalist] partisans.”103
Soviet forces in West Ukraine often used gender as a channel to influence family
members. The method of influencing rebels through their women folk was a
common Soviet tactic. Ukrainian rebel wife Mariya Savchyn, for instance, was
arrested in January 1949 by the MGB. Knowing that her husband was an officer in
the Ukrainian resistance, the MGB released her on the presumption that she would
persuade her husband to leave the underground and work for them. Instead, she
exploited her release as an opportunity to go underground with her husband in
Volhynia, where she remained until she was apprehended again in summer 1953.104
Similarly, the Ukrainian rebel underground tried to influence men through their
wives. In instructions calling for the boycott of elections to the Supreme Soviet in
February 1946, women were called upon directly: “Women, stay out of trouble, for
the sake of your children — boycott the Stalinist ‘elections.’ Stop your husbands
from voting. Death to Stalin! Death to Khrushchev! Long live the OUN! Long live
the unified Ukrainian independent state!”105
101. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 128, ł. 227 ob.
102. See the summaries and extracts from their subsequent confessions in GARF, f. R-9478,
op. 1, d. 128, ll. 225-230, dated 26 December 1944.
103. See the report for 15 August 1944 from Lisets raion rebel commander Kochevik to OUN
headquarters, subsequently seized by the NKVD. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 336, l. 181. 
104. Mariya Savchyn (“Marichka”), Tysiacha dorih (spohady), op. cit.
105. OUN-UPA instructions calling for boycott of the 10 February 1946 elections for the
Supreme Soviet, TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2968, l. 216. 
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The meaning of violence
“Words may be eloquent, but how much more so is
silence. […]
Wanda Pół tawska, And I am afraid of my dreams.106
“The ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them
from consciousness. […] Atrocities, however, refuse to
be buried.”
Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery.
Having endeavored to identify distinct gender patterns in the civil war in West
Ukraine, and having taken the step toward rediscovering Ukrainian rebel women’s
contributions and tragic lives, there still remains the task of explaining the
conundrum with which this investigation began: how do we account for the relative
silence of Ukrainian discussions of women’s roles in the rebel underground, versus
the Soviet accounts that emphasize women’s active participation?
The logic of Ukrainian silence
In the course of researching and writing this article, I spoke with hundreds of people
about this divergency between Ukrainian and Soviet accounts of women’s roles in
the underground movement, and received just as many different responses. It is
interesting to note that nearly all those ethnic Ukrainians questioned — male or
female, young or old, native Ukrainian or diaspora — agreed that we know so little
about women’s contributions because of Ukrainian male attitudes. Men and women
alike spoke rather passionately on this theme, and often referred to a distinct male
machismo among “Old World” Ukrainian men. Certainly, the leadership of the
Ukrainian Insurrection Army were not the sort of men who would readily share the
limelight with their women.
While it is tempting to accept such an explanation at face value, there are limits
to what we can achieve by blaming traditional patriarchalism or male chauvinism
alone for this long-neglected area of historical inquiry. Certainly, a record of
countless female victims is hardly the stuff of which “heroic struggle” is made,
even as diaspora accounts have long endeavored to transform male victims into
heroes: evidently, male suffering is somehow more “courageous” and “heroic” than
female suffering. Male victimologies lend themselves more readily to heroic
histories. In contrast, female victims of gender violence are less likely to be viewed
as heroes and more likely to be construed as reminders of defeat. This is especially
so in patriarchal societies. As Gerda Lerner perceptively noted in her pathbreaking
study of female subordination: “The impact on the conquered of the rape of
conquered women was twofold: it dishonored the women and by implication
106. Wanda Pół tawska, And I am afraid of my dreams (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964) :
107.
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served as a symbolic castration of their men. Men in patriarchal societies who
cannot protect the sexual purity of their wives, sisters and children are truly
impotent and dishonored.”107 Descriptions of the horrific scenes of gender violence
left over from ethnic nationalist brutality certainly eluded heroic imagery. As a
nationalist partisan recalled: “Special treatment was always meted out to women.
Rape is the male conqueror’s instinctive privilege, his way of defiling and
possessing his victim, and killing and sex are thus intertwined. […] The naked
remains of women often showed signs of mutilation — their vaginas had usually
been slit open. Even small girls had been carved with knives and bayonets.”108 
The more extreme version of this “chauvinism” line would assert that having
found themselves dependent on women in 1944-1945, and having faced increasing
losses to the Soviets, “chauvinistic” Ukrainian men lashed out against suspected
“weak women” in their ranks: increasingly stymied by Soviet forces, Ukrainian
rebel men took out their anger and frustration on their own womenfolk; hence, the
absence of effort in subsequent years to rehabilitate the memory of women’s
contributions. A broader, less judgmental amalgam of the above would identify the
context of widespread violence and brutality, and see the evidence of skyrocketing
violence of Ukrainian men against their own womenfolk as a characteristic
symptom of their own post-traumatic stress. As a leading authority on the
psychology of male gender violence has argued, “Abused men abuse women.”109 
And, what is equally true, there was a dearth of women candidates pushing for
recognition of their own heroic status. The Latvian émigré writer Agate Nesaule put
it best: “No one ever wants to hear about the painful parts of my past. People have
hundreds of ways, both subtle and harsh, to reinforce my own reluctance to tell.”110
The foremost American psychiatric expert on women and trauma, Dr. Judith
107. Gerda Lerner, The creation of patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) : 80.
108. W. Lotnik, op. cit.: 66-67. Though he was a Polish partisan, Lotnik made it clear that such
descriptions could be applied equally to the carnage inflicted by both sides, ethnic Ukrainian
and ethnic Polish: “The ethnic Ukrainians responded by wiping out an entire Polish colony,
setting fire to the houses, killing those inhabitants unable to flee and raping the women who fell
into their hands, no matter how old or young. This had been the pattern of their behaviour east
of the Bug [River], where tens of thousands of Poles had been either expelled or murdered. We
retaliated by attacking an even bigger Ukrainian village and[…]killed women and children.
Some of [our men] were so filled with hatred after losing whole generations of their family in
the Ukrainian attacks that they swore they would take an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. […]
This was how the fighting escalated. Each time more people were killed, more houses burnt,
more women raped” (65). Cf. Beverly Allen, Rape warfare: The hidden genocide in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
109. Jim Hopper, “Factors in the cycle of violence,” Journal of Traumatic Stress, (1996): 721-
743. Drawing from an extensive comparative study of statistics of criminal violence and
homicide in 110 nations since 1900, sociologists Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner found
that the frequency of domestic violence dramatically increases after wars. See their landmark
study: D. Archer and R. Gartner,Violence and crime in cross-national perspective (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1984-1987).
110. Agate Nesaule, Woman in amber: Healing the trauma of war and exile (New York:
Soho,1995): 9. 
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Herman, adds: “To speak about [violent] experiences in sexual or domestic life was
to invite public humiliation, ridicule and disbelief.”111 
An interpretation that emphasizes the interplay of male intolerance and female
reluctance would not be without historical precedent. Working on a similar set of
circumstances in postwar Soviet-occupied East Germany, psychologist Erika
Hoerning has argued that while German women who had suffered rape at the hands
of Soviet soldiers in 1945 were by and large loyal to their men, and did not blame
them for the violence they had suffered, the men were in denial and often accused
their abused and terrorized women of fraternizing with the enemy, a contemporary
equivalent of victimizing the victim of rape twice: terrorized by Soviet forces, the
rape victim was in turn ostracized by her family and community.112 The woman’s
implied “consent” to be a victim of violence (exemplified by the fact that she lived
to tell the tale rather than dying in the struggle to save her virtue) meant ipso facto
that she had collaborated with her perpetrator, and deserved not compassion but
disdain.
In all of the above scenarios, there are ample combinations for reaching a
satisfactory, though tragic, explanation for the relative silence on women’s
contributions, and gender violence, in the Ukrainian insurrection. Ukrainian
women certainly provided substantial contributions to the Ukrainian struggle, and
there is little excuse or explanation for the subsequent silence about it.
The dynamics of Soviet policing
But is it fair to focus on the victims alone to explain the apparent divergency
between Soviet and Ukrainian accounts? Mass terror, mass arrests, imprisonment,
torture, rape, were all tactics that fell under the rubric of Soviet dezorganizatsiia —
“disorganization” of the enemy’s home base. Soviet state violence was a means, not
111. Judith Herman, Trauma and recovery : The aftermath of violence — from domestic abuse
to political terror (New York: Basic Books, 1992, 1997): 4; Katherine R. Jolluck, “Gender,
identity and the Polish experience of war, 1939-1945” (Ph.D. Diss., Stanford University,
1995): 160-161.
112. Erika M. Hoerning, “The myth of female loyalty,” Journal of Psychohistory, 16, 1 (1988):
19-46. Cf. Elizabeth Heineman, “The hour of the woman: Memories of Germany’s ‘crisis
years’ and West German national identity,” American Historical Review, 101, 2 (April 1996):
354-395. On Soviet rape in East Germany, see Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A
history of the Soviet Zone of occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1995): 69-140. Cf. Meinhard Stark, “Ich muß sagen wie es war” Deutsche
Frauen des GULag (Berlin: Metropol-Verlag, 1998).
 After forty-five years of silence, noted Hungarian child psychologist from Transylvania,
Alaine Polcz, revealed in her memoirs first published in 1991 that she had been gang-raped
hundreds of times by Soviet soldiers in 1945. In Polcz’s account, Soviet soldiers reserved
especially brutal reprisals for women suspected of pro-German collaboration: “The Russians,
after first raping them, cut off with knives the breasts of the women who had cohabited with the
Germans.” This usually followed ritualized scenes of humiliation where the women’s heads
were shaved, and then they were marched down local streets humiliated by jeers and insults
from their former neighbors. A. Polcz, A wartime memoir: Hungary, 1944-1945 (Budapest:
Corvina, 1991-1998): 65.
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an end: it was neither the product of excesses of individuals, nor an end in itself, but
was part of a deliberate campaign to destroy the self-identity of local populations,
to drive a wedge between organized resistance and the society-at-large, and to
intimidate further potential acts of opposition. Two accounts, taken verbatim from
a Soviet Communist Party Control Commission review in 1946 of the first eighteen
months of the Ukrainian Communist Party’s struggle against nationalist rebels in
West Ukraine after the war, reveal the degree to which Soviet MVD/MGB officers
in West Ukraine exploited rape for their own personal and operational interests:
“Chief of the Gliniavskyi raion MVD in L´viv oblast´ Matiukhin P.E. in
February [1946], while interrogating [ethnic Ukrainian woman] Mikhal´skaia
E.G., raped and brutally beat her. Kept under arrest from 27 January to 18
February of this year, Mikhal´skaia has been released from prison [following a
determination that she had been arrested on the basis] of unsubstantiated
charges. Matiukhin likewise raped at least four other illegally arrested girls:
Pasternak, Kostyv, Pokyra and Stepanova. [In each case], they were released
after having been subjected to violence and insults.”113
“Chief of the Bogorodchanskyi raion MVD in Stanyslaviv oblast´ Bespalov
M.D. and his deputy Borisov I.Z. in February of this year illegally arrested
women citizens Snyt´ko Mariia and Fanega Praskov´ia. Both were beaten during
interrogation and then incarcerated in a cold cell. After her release Snyt´ko died
from wounds suffered during the beating. Snit´ko’s corpse lay in her apartment
for two days until it was discovered by neighboring peasants who threatened reta-
liation against those who had done this to her in the raion MVD headquarters.”114
Rape was an integral part of Soviet interrogation methods of West Ukrainian
women. In his diaries, Polish doctor Zygmunt Klukowski recalled: “In our cell we
could sometimes hear the shouts and loud crying of those questioned […],
particularly women.”115 The precise nature of what went on there was suggested by
the powerful words of Polish inmate Eugenia Swojda: “[A]s a woman I was driven
to despair.”116 A Latvian woman who survived six months of Soviet incarceration
and interrogation back in the 1940s, and then remained silent about her ordeal for
the next fifty years, recalled:
“I was questioned in all sorts of ways, beaten in all sorts of ways, they did
everything. They took me where nails are pulled off, where people were
113. Top secret report of N. Gusarov, Inspector TsK VKP(b), to secretaries of the Central
Committee of the USSR, Stalin, Zhdanov, Kuznetsov, Patolichev, and Popov, “Nedostatki i
oshibki v ideologicheskoi rabote KP(b)U[krainy],” 13 August 1946. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d.
137, l. 44.
114. Ibid., ll. 44-45.
115. Z. Klukowski, op. cit.: 148; Cf. the account in Jan Tomasz Gross, Revolution from abroad:
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University Press, 1988): 181.
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writhing on electrical chairs. They said, ‘you will get the same if you don’t tell
us where your brothers and the others are.’ Dear lord! What can I say?”117
In the face of organized Soviet mass terror, local populations were dumbstruck,
silenced, cowed into submission, often remaining silent for decades after the
violence had ended. And perhaps this was, after all, the whole point of the Soviet
brutality: to disorganize the local population, to deprive them of any hope of
effective resistance to Soviet power.
There are no better illustrations of the Soviet use of rape as a tactical weapon in
warfare than those found in the records of Soviet spetsgruppy in West Ukraine:
evidently, special MGB maskirovka units regularly brutalized local Ukrainian
women while disguised as rebels. Here is just one of myriad examples found in
Soviet police files:
“On the night of 23 July 1948 the same spetsgruppa [masquerading as rebel
bandits] from Podvysots´ke village abducted in the forest a young woman
REPNYTSKA Nina Iakovlevna, born in 1931. 
In the forest REPNYTSKA was subjected to tortures. 
While interrogating REPNYTSKA, members of the spetsgruppa beat her
severely, hung her upside down by her legs, forced a stick into her genitalia, and
then one by one raped her. 
In a helpless condition, REPNYTSKA was abandoned in the forest, where
her husband found her and took her to the hospital, where REPNYTSKA spent
an extended period recovering.”118
The logic? Following officially sanctioned procedures, Soviet policemen disguised
themselves as rebels, then perpetrated atrocities in their name, hoping in this way to
provoke distrust and antagonism between rebel units and the local population. In
this context, gender violence was not an end in itself, but a tactical weapon that
utilized women’s bodies to fight a wider conflict. 
Whether they were rapists in Soviet uniforms, petty officials in the local
apparatus, or even members of Soviet spetsgruppy perpetrating acts of gender
violence under orders, Soviet authorities did themselves play a critical role in the
creation of an image of the enemy other that included not just Ukrainian men, but
also Ukrainian women and children. The logic of Soviet institution building
dictated a definition of the Ukrainian enemy that would justify violence against
young and old, male and female. At a meeting of thirty-five Soviet Party, MGB,
and MVD officers in West Ukraine with then General Secretary Lazar´
Kaganovich, Nikita Khrushchev, and Ukrainian Minister of State Security
S.R. Savchenko in L´viv on 23 April 1947, the Drohobych obkom secretary
Gorobets noted that 60% of all locals sentenced for Ukrainian nationalism in 1946
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had been women and girls, even as only 8% of the local UPA rank-and-file were
female.119 Stanyslaviv obkom secretary M. Slon´ explained the reasoning for the
disproportionate focus on Ukrainian women and children: “We must repress family
members as traitors against the nation. We must deport families of rebels as
dangerous threats to state security.”120 The logic of the mass arrests and mass
deportations was to punish not just the rebels, but also their families, friends, and
loved ones, all who fell into Soviet punitive traps as “collaborators” with the
organized anti-Soviet opposition. Add to this the practical issue: while male rebels
often managed to elude Soviet capture, their wives, mothers, daughters, cousins,
and neighbors were readily available for retaliation delivered at the hands of
frustrated Stalinist policemen.
The corollary of this argument would be that if the Ukrainian rebel woman had
not existed, the Soviet state would certainly have created her. For we are speaking
here not just about individual acts of violence, but of a deepseated and powerfully
institutionalized state violence in which Soviet cadres had to be rallied time and
again to transform abstract justice into particular acts of “enforcement.” Which is to
say: Ukrainian women appear so often as enemy rebels in Soviet profiles not just
because there really were so many women rebels, but also because there were so
many women victims of Soviet power. Here, as so often, the crime contained the
seeds for its own self-justification and legitimization: from the Soviet police
perspective, Ukrainian women were punished because they were rebels. Which is
just another way of saying: if their victims were guilty, then the police were self-
assuredly innocent of any crime when they perpetrated acts of terror against them.
In the same way that well-dressed women were once blamed for luring their own
rapists, Ukrainian women were — by Soviet definition — deserving of any
punishment they received at the hands of Soviet policemen. For Soviet power in
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